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1. INTRODUCTION
Although the government of Switzerland is internationally re-
nowned for its neutrality, the same can hardly be claimed of Swiss pub-
lic stock corporations.' Acquisition activities of Swiss public corpora-
tions with respect to foreign companies have been markedly aggressive
in recent years.
Among the successful unfriendly takeover campaigns2 for foreign
1 The stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft) is the preferred business form in
Switzerland. As of December, 1988, there were 147,113 registered Swiss stock corpora-
tions, which is roughly half the number of registered Swiss business entities. Immer
Mehr Aktiengesellschaft und Vereine, Tages-Anzeiger, Jan. 21-22, 1989, no. 17 at 35.
Since as a practical matter only public corporations come into question as possible hos-
tile takeover candidates (see Immenga, Oeffentliche Uebernahmeangebote, 47 ScHwE-
IZERISCHE AxTIENGESELLSCHAFr 89, 90 (1975) [hereinafter SAG]), the scope of this
Article is limited to the several hundred Swiss stock corporations whose shares are
listed on one or more of Switzerland's seven stock exchanges [hereinafter public
corporations].
' As used throughout this Article, terms such as "unfriendly takeover" or "hostile
takeover" refer generally to the acquisition of control of a target company against the
wishes of management through secondary market stock purchases; the term "tender
offer" refers more specifically to the making of a public offer to purchase shares di-
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companies mounted by Swiss public corporations in the recent past are
Nestle S.A.'s 1985 takeover of Carnation Foods, a U.S. food conglom-
erate, for $3 billion;' Ciba-Geigy AG's 1987 unfriendly acquisition of
the San Jose firm Spectra-Physics, Inc., the world's largest laser pro-
ducer;" and the 1988 takeover, also by Nestl6, of the British candy
manufacturer Rowntree-MacIntosh for a purchase price of 6.6 billion
Swiss francs.5 Less successful but equally unfriendly in nature were
Gurit-Heberlein AG's unsuccessful attempt to gain majority control of
its long-standing U.S. joint venture partner, Essex Chemical Corpora-
tion, in 1988;' Sandoz AG's failed bid to acquire the U.S. spice manu-
facturer, McCormick & Co., Inc.;' F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co.
AG's unsuccessful 1988 tender offer for Sterling Drugs, Inc. in the
amount of $4.3 billion;' and Jacobs'Suchard AG's unsuccessful 1988
tender offer for Rowntree-MacIntosh.9 Uncontested acquisitions by
Swiss stock corporations of foreign corporations, in particular U.S.
companies, have also increased in frequency in recent years.10 One ex-
ample is Credit Suisse's 1988 acquisition of ownership in CS First Bos-
ton Inc. (CSFB), a major New York investment banking group founded
by Credit Suisse together with its former joint venture partner First
rected at a target company's shareholders.
I Nestle/ Carnation: Hochzeit mit Dissonanzen, Schweizerische Handelszeitung
[hereinafter SHZ], Jan. 10, 1985, no. 2 at 10. The takeover of Carnation by NestlE, a
multiconglomerate based in Vevey, Switzerland, ranked as one of the then-largest hos-
tile takeovers of a U.S. company by a foreign corporation. Zwischen Heidi und den
Gnomen von Zfirich, Tages-Anzeiger, Dec. 2, 1988, no. 282 at 2.
" Spectra-Physics, SanJosi: Spate Reue ist Teuer, SHZ, Oct. 6, 1988, no. 40 at
37. Ciba-Geigy is a Basel-based chemical and pharmaceutical concern.
I Die "siissen" Ritter, SHZ, June 30, 1988, no. 26 at 1. The Lenzburg-based
Hero concern subsequently engaged in a hostile takeover battle for control of the Italian
fruit and jam manufacturer Zeugg. Hero hat Appetit aufSudtiroler Konfiture, Tages-
Anzeiger, Oct. 5, 1989, no. 231 at 33.
' Essex Chemical/Gurit-Heberlein: Die Geschichte ist mehr als peinlich, SHZ,
Aug. 18, 1988, no. 33 at 33. Takeover by the Swiss chemical and textile firm was
avoided through the acquisition of Essex Chemical by Dow Chemical Co. Dow Chemi-
cal als "white knight" flir Essex, Neuer Zurcher Zeitung [NZZ], Sept. 7, 1988, no.
208 at 35.
7 Riickzug ins Rkduit?, NZZ, Jan. 23-24, 1988, no. 18 at 33. Sandoz AG is a
Basel-based chemical and pharmaceutical concern.
' Nabisco-Roulette als Eisbergspitze: Merger-Mania, SHZ, Nov. 17, 1988, no. 46
at 1. Sterling Drugs was rescued by "white knight" Eastman Kodax from takeover by
the Basel-based chemical and pharmaceutical concern Hoffmann-La Roche. Id.
I Although its attempt to acquire Rowntree was defeated by Nestle, see supra
note 5, Jacobs Suchard, a Neuchatel-based chocolate and coffee manufacturer, reaped a
profit of approximately 460 million Sfr. through the subsequent sale of its Rowntree
shareholdings to Nestl6. Elegant entledigt sich Jacobs seiner 400-Millionen-"Bilrde",
Tages-Anzei.ger, Apr. 21, 1989, no. 92 at 33.
'0 See Uber 300 Fusionen von Schweizer Firmen, Tages-Anzeiger, Jan. 5, 1989,
no. 3 at 31 (increase in total foreign acquisitions from 206 in 1987 to 315 in 1988, and
in acquisitions of U.S. companies from 15 to 25).
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Boston, Inc., was arguably limited to forty-five percent largely because
of the restraining effect of applicable ownership limitations under the
Glass-Steagall Act, which regulates the separation of U.S. commercial
and investment banking activities.11
Within Switzerland, Swiss corporations have typically been
praised for being "dynamic" in their use of unfriendly takeover tactics
to acquire control of foreign companies.1 2 At the same time, however,
many within the Swiss business community express the view that an
unfriendly acquisition - insofar as a Swiss corporation builds its tar-
get - "does not correspond to the proper business policies of a respect-
able Swiss firm."1" This view is echoed by the current Swiss Stock Cor-
poration Act,14 which permits the board of directors of a Swiss
corporation,'- with the approval of its shareholders, to erect formidable,
if not insurmountable, barriers against unfriendly takeovers, and in
particular against unfriendly takeovers by foreign acquirors.
The striking incongruity between the quasi-immunity from foreign
takeover available to Swiss stock corporations under Swiss law and
their avid pursuit of target corporations in foreign countries through
the use of hostile takeover tactics has provoked international comment
and criticism. In 1988, for example, influential British politicians -
questioning the right of Swiss stock corporations to freely acquire im-
"' Variantenreiche Wege der SKA in den USA, NZZ, Oct. 15-16, 1988, no. 241
at 33. Credit Swisse's ownership was subsequently transferred to Credit Swisse's Swiss
parent company, CS Holding. See also Imponierendes Muskelspiel des ABB-Konzerns,
NZZ, Mar. 22, 1990, no. 67 at 17 (foreign ed.) (1989 and 1990 acquisitions by Asea
Brown Boveri (ABB), Ziurich, of Combustion Engineering and certain Westinghouse
divisions); Hoffmann-La Roche to acquire Genentech, Fin. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at 1,
col. 3 (1990 acquisition of leading U.S. biotechnology group Genentech by Hoffmann-
La Roche); Basis Erweiterung der "Winterthur" in den USA, NZZ, Mar. 14, 1990,
no. 60 at 13 (foreign ed.) (1990 acquisition by "Winterthur" Insurance Company of
General Casualty Companies, so-called "crown jewel" of American Reliance Group).
12 See, e.g., Es wird kalt um den Aktiondr, Die Weltwoche, Dec. 31, 1987, no. 53
at 13; Hartmann, Takeovers in Switzerland, Finanz & Wirtschaft [hereinafter FuW],
Mar. 16, 1988, no. 21 at 1.
11 Vinkulierung und unfriendly takeovers: Zfige einer Gewaltaktion, SHZ, Aug.
4, 1988, no. 31 at 13 (statement of Dr. H. Fluckiger, president and director of Berne
Insurance Company)("Der 'unfriendly takeover' entspricht nicht der . .. doch recht
wohlanstindigen Geschiftspraxis von angesehenen Schweizer Firmen"). See also Hart-
mann, supra note 12 (Swiss media does not consider takeover contests in Switzerland to
be proper behavior).
14 The Swiss Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz) is composed of Section 26,
Articles 620-763 of the Swiss Code of Obligations (Bundesgesetz betreffend die Er-
ginzung des Schweizerischen Zivil-gesetzbuches (Fiinfter Teil: Obligationenrecht), vom
30. MNrz 1911 (SR 220)) [hereinafter OR].
15 As the minimum duties and powers of the Verwaltungsrat under the Swiss
Stock Corporation Act correspond generally to those of the board of directors of a U.S.
stock corporation, the term "board of directors" will be used to refer to the Verwal-
tungsrat throughout this Article.
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portant British companies while being permitted under Swiss law to
shut out British investors - demanded investigation by the U.K. Mo-
nopolies and Mergers Commission of the takeover bids of Nestle and
Jacobs Suchard for Rowntree-MacIntosh." Similarly, subsequent to
the founding of the CSFB by First Boston and Credit Suisse, and the
consequent increase of Credit Suisse's influence in the Wall Street in-
vestment banking market, a member of the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) pointed to Switzerland as an example of a
country whose corporations were actively involved in the acquisition of
foreign corporations while enjoying de facto immunity from takeover by
foreign acquirors1 7 In the wake of the Nestl/Rowntree takeover, the
Commission of the European Community (EC) contemplated including
a reciprocity clause in its draft guidelines on public tender offers,
prohibiting a bidder from a non-EC country - such as Switzerland -
from making a tender offer for an EC target company if reciprocal
takeover conditions did not exist in the bidder's country of
incorporation. 8
The rising chorus of international criticism aimed at the de facto
barriers against foreign takeovers in Switzerland has led to a certain
amount of discomfort in Swiss financial and political circles. Swiss poli-
ticians, among others, 9 fear a possible boomerang effect in light of the
extreme dependency of Switzerland's economy on access to interna-
tional markets2" and its corresponding vulnerability to takeover reci-
procity requirements restricting such access. Within the Swiss financial
sector, it is feared that continued restrictions on the acquisition of Swiss
title shares by foreign investors could lead to a decline in international
demand for other Swiss financial instruments as well, resulting in an
16 Neue Phase im Ubernahmekampf um Rowntree, NZZ, May 7-8, 1988, no. 106
at 35.
'1 U.S.-Kritik an der Schweizer Vinkulierungspraxis, NZZ, Nov. 11, 1988, no.
264 at 33. Such remarks were coupled with a reference to the possible need for punitive
countermeasures. Id.
11 EG-Richtlinie fir iffentliche Ubernahmeangebote, NZZ, Dec. 23, 1988, no.
300 at 33. See LambsdorfflKritik an Schweizer Vinkulierung, Tages-Anzeiger, May
11, 1988, no. 109 at 33 (criticism by former West German Economic Minister Lamb-
sdorff of stock transfer restrictions allowed under Swiss law).
1 See, e.g., Delamuraz kritisiert Namenaktien-Vinkulierung, Tages-Anzeiger,
June 18, 1988, no. 140 at 33 (Swiss Federal Minister Jean-Pascal Delamurz); Zuver-
sicht und Reformbereitschaft, FuW, Sept. 24, 1988, no. 75 at 3 (Dr. Markus Lusser,
president of the Swiss National Bank); Eine Denkpause in der Aktienrechtsreform?,
NZZ, Jan. 28-29, 1989, no. 23 at 33 (Swiss corporate law professor and practitioner
Dr. Peter Forstmoser).
"0 Many Swiss public corporations achieve from 70-80% of their total corporate
turnover outside Switzerland; in the case of certain larger firms, such as Nest&, Hoff-
mann-La Roche, and Ciba-Geigy, this figure is over 95%. SHZ-Liste: Oft im
Verborgenen, SHZ, June 2, 1988, no. 22 at 1.
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increase in the cost of raising capital for Swiss corporations and a de-
cline in the significance and status of Swiss stock exchanges.21 Others
point to a possible long-term decline in innovation and efficiency in the
absence of the threat of hostile takeover.
22
In the face of such concerns, a number of Switzerland's largest
public corporations - conscious of their dependence on international as
well as domestic equity financings - have taken steps to eliminate ex-
isting prohibitions on the acquisition of title shares by foreigners. Such
steps, however, have typically been accompanied by the imposition of
restrictive stock registration and voting limits. 23 Indeed, efforts inside
many, if not most, corporate boardrooms in Switzerland have been de-
voted to the sharpening, rather than the easing, of stock transfer and
voting restrictions, and to ensuring that revisions to the Stock Corpora-
tion Act will provide sufficient protection against unwanted Swiss, as
well as foreign, raiders in the future. Over the past few years Switzer-
land has experienced its own "hostile takeover wave," hardly compara-
ble in size to that of the United States but nonetheless causing alarm
among Swiss board members unaccustomed to such events. 24 In the ab-
sence of laws, rules, or regulations governing the conduct of hostile
takeover contests in Switzerland, the new breed of "Swiss raider" has
typically been able to amass a substantial amount of stock on the sec-
ondary market without making a tender offer to shareholders and with-
2 See, e.g., Hartmann,- supra note 12; Vinkulierungspraxis: Tettamenti-Syn-
drom, SHZ, Apr. 21, 1988, no. 16 at 1; Erholungskursfr den Finanzmarkt Schweiz,
NZZ, July 9-10, 1988 no. 158 at 33, 34. See also Den Aktiondrsblues hoch gesungen
und dabei froh gezecht, Tages-Anzeiger, Aug. 13, 1988, no. 187 at 31 (questioning
listing on Swiss stock exchanges of companies whose shares are practically
unpurchaseable).
22 See, e.g., Rilckzug ins Rduit?, supra note 7, at 34 (stock market is gauge of
efficiency and competive ability; shutting down or restricting mechanism could impair
economically desirable optimization of resources).
22 In November, 1988, subsequent to its unfriendly takeover bid for Rowntree,
Nestl6 announced that it would allow foreigners to acquire title shares, subject to the
simultaneous imposition of three percent limits, applicable to both Swiss and foreign
investors, on the maximum amount of title share capital registrable to, and the maxi-
mum number of total share capital to be voted by, any single investor or investor group.
Weichere Vinkulierung von Nestlg-Aktien, NZZ, Nov. 18, 1988, no. 270 at 33. The
Nestle decision set a precedent which has thus far been followed by a limited number
of other major Swiss public corporations, including the Swiss Reinsurance Company,
the ZUrich Insurance Company, and, more recently, BBC Brown Boveri and Ciba-
Geigy. See infra note 46.
2'4 The attention attracted by the wave of hostile takeover attempts within Switzer-
land is attested to by the accompanying wave of recently published or to be published
German-language materials. Especially recent are the following: A Kuy, DER
VERWALTUNGSRAT IM UEBERNAHMEKAMPF (1989); M. STEINMANN, PRAEVENTIVE
ABWEHRMASSNAHMEN MIT MITTELN DES AKTIENRECHTES (1989); R. WATTER, UN-
TERNEHMENSUEBERNAHMEN (1990).
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out the knowledge of the target corporation's board of directors. De-
spite such substantial raider advantages, however, attempts in
Switzerland to wrest corporate control away from an unwilling board
have thus far enjoyed a success rate approaching zero, largely because
of the degree of control over corporate affairs granted Swiss boards of
directors under existing Swiss laws and bank conventions. Currently, a
non-Swiss investor's chances of successfully acquiring a Swiss corpora-
tion largely depend on whether or not there is a controlling shareholder
willing to sell his shares: indeed, as one commentator has remarked, an
objective observer might well ask himself if it is, indeed, possible to take
control of a company in Switzerland without finding the company's of-
ficers, board of directors, and the entire Swiss legislature standing,
whining, before one's door.25
The purpose of this Article is to examine the various layers of
takeover protection, both direct and indirect, shielding Swiss public
stock corporations from hostile takeover under both the Swiss Stock
Corporation Act and the currently proposed legislative revisions
thereto. A secondary objective is to explore the extent to which such
protection is inadequate in protecting Swiss stock corporations and
their shareholders from the evils associated with hostile takeover at-
tempts, while being overly successful in insulating corporations and
shareholders from certain benefits associated with hostile takeovers.
Part 2 presents an overview of Swiss title and bearer shares, the owner-
ship structure of Swiss public corporations, and the various hostile
takeover defenses, against foreign as well as Swiss would-be acquirors-
of-control, available to Swiss public corporations under current law.
Part 3 examines the effectiveness of these defensive measures in the
context of actual hostile takeover contests that have taken place in Swit-
zerland. Part 4 outlines proposed legislative revisions to the Swiss Stock
Corporation Act and examines the possible impact of such revisions on
hostile takeover activity in the future. The control over corporate affairs
afforded Swiss boards of directors is arguably influenced less by the
cornucopia of takeover defenses made available by current Swiss law
25 Aktionarsschutz." Vom "Zmorge" zum "Zvieri", SHZ, Mar. 12, 1987, no. 11 at
1 (". . . der unabhingige Beobachter fragt sich, ob es doch - sogar - in unserem
Lande noch m glich ist, eine Gesellschaft zu fibernehmen, ohne dass Management,
Verwaltungsrat und Regierungsrat schon jammernd vor der Tiire stehen. . . ."). Cf
Ebenroch & Eyles, Die Beschridnkung von Hostile Takeovers in Delaware, 34 RECHT
DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 413, 415 n.21 (1988) (citing Browne & Rosen-
gren, New Eng. Econ. Rev. July-Aug. 1987, 13, 14) (only 10% of all of the U.S.
companies that were made the subjects of tender offers during 1985 were able to pre-
vent ultimately being taken over).
See infra note 53.
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than by certain legal and practical factors affecting the exercise of
shareholder voting rights within Swiss stock corporations. Thus, Part 5
describes shareholder voting mechanisms under the Swiss Stock Corpo-
ration Act and certain guidelines of the Swiss Bankers' Association, and
Part 6 examines the impact of inadequate investor and corporate dis-
closure, including the impact of the so-called "hidden reserves," on the
exercise of shareholder voting rights in Switzerland. Finally, the Article
summarizes certain inadequacies of the current Swiss Stock Corpora-
tion Act and proposed revisions thereto with respect to the problems
currently posed by hostile takeovers within Switzerland, and suggests a
new avenue for addressing such problems.
2. TAKEOVER DEFENSES AVAILABLE UNDER THE SWISS STOCK
CORPORATION ACT
2.1. Swiss Shares and Share Corporations Generally
The Swiss Stock Corporation Act provides for two categories of
voting stock - title shares and bearer shares. Swiss public stock corpo-
rations typically offer both forms of voting stock to the investing public.
Although profit-sharing participation certificates (PS) are also issued
by Swiss public corporations, PS are not considered "stock" under cur-
rent law because no voting or other corporate membership rights attach
to such certificates. 6 Changing the number of issued bearer shares and
title shares, such as through a conversion of bearer shares into title
shares or vice-versa, requires the adoption of an appropriate amend-
ment to the certificate of incorporation.
Under the Swiss Corporation Act, shares of a Swiss corporation
are required to have a minimum par value per share of at least 100
Sfr."8 In the absence of articles in the certificate of incorporation setting
forth stricter approval requirements, each new share issuance requires
the approval of a majority of the voting shares whose holders are pre-
sent or represented at a shareholder meeting (hereinafter a simple
shareholder majority).29 Preemptive shareholder rights attach to each
2 See OR, art. 692, para. II (prohibiting non-voting stock). Issued PS capital has
reached levels in the past equal to 20-40% of the issued share capital of some public
corporations. E. TILLMANN, DAs DEPOTSTIMMRECHT DER BANKEN, Schweizer
Schriften zum Handels-und Wirtschaftsrecht [SSHW], Vol. 80, 128 (1985). See infra
note 48.
27 OR, art. 626. (corporation's certificate of incorporation must state exact number
of bearer shares and title shares issued). A Swiss corporation's certificate of incorpora-
tion (Statuten) and bylaws (Reglement) are basically equivalent to a U.S. corporation's
certificate of incorporation and by-laws.
28 OR, art. 622, para. III.
28 See generally OR arts. 650-53. Although as a formal matter the Stock Corpora-
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new issuance of shares to the extent that such rights are not excluded in
the certificate of incorporation or by the approval of a simple share-
holder majority, in the absence of a higher shareholder approval stan-
dard set forth in the certificate of incorporation."0 In the latter case, the
specific instance of preemptive rights exclusion must be justified by suf-
ficient objective grounds for the exclusion.31 The Swiss Stock Corpora-
tion Act does not currently allow a corporation to have authorized but
unissued shares; 2 nor does it permit the retirement of issued shares of
a Swiss stock corporation, other than pursuant to a capital reduction. 3
Even though Article 659 of the Stock Corporation Act formally forbids
most corporate repurchases, including defensive repurchases during un-
friendly takeover contests, corporate repurchases generally are tolerated
to the extent that share capital and legally-required reserves are not
thereby impaired. 4 Shares of "reserve" stock, issued stock that has
been repurchased by or has otherwise landed in the possession of the
issuer, may be reissued at a later point in time, 5 without the need to
tion Act requires shareholders' meetings to be held both prior to and subsequent to an
issuance, such formality is avoided in practice through a suspended share issuance of
already-subscribed shares to a third party trustee. See Federal Council Proposals for a
Revised Stock Corporation Act (Bundesritliche Botschaft fiber die Revision des Ak-
tienrechtes vom 23. Februar 1983 (BB1 1983 II 745)), § 204.1 at 47 [hereinafter
Botschaft].
30 OR, arts. 652, 703.
31 Meier-Schatz, Aktienrechtliche Verteidigungsvorkehren gegen unerwinschte
Unternehmensfibernahmen, 60 SAG 106, 114 (1988); P. FORSTMIOSER & A. MAIER-
HAYOZ, EINFOHRUNG IN DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE AKTIENRECHT, § 35 245 n. 19 (3d ed.
1983)[hereinafter FoRsTMOSER & MEIER-HAYOZ]. Cf Judgment of the First Civil
Division of July 6, 1965, 91 Decisions of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (Entscheidungen
des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts) [BGE] II 298, 304. (preemptive rights exclusion
based on status of minority shareholder as competitor of corporation impermissible).
1, FORTMOSER & MEIER-HAYoz, supra note 31, § 39 264 n. 1; Arnold, Defenses
to Takeovers - Switzerland, 8 INT. Bus. LAW. 41, 42 (1980). Because of a need to
have issued shares available in case conversion rights or stock options are exercised, the
practice has developed among Swiss public corporations of placing quasi-"treasury
shares" in trust, with Swiss banks as trustees, for ultimate issuance to third parties.
Normally, but not always, such banks are contractually required to forego the exercise
of voting rights with respect to the shares held in trust. David gegen Goliath, NZZ,
Oct. 7-8, 1989, no. 233 at 33. But see infra note 139.
3s Judgment of the First Civil Division of April 19, 1988, 114 BGE II 57, 61.
Thus, the term "issued and outstanding" in connection with the share capital of a
Swiss stock corporation is redundant.
31 Judgment of the First Civil Division of September 18, 1934, 60 BGE II 313,
316 (corporate repurchases not invalid unless impairment of share capital or legal
reserves would result); Judgment of the First Civil Division of May 25, 1917, 43 BGE
II 293, 299 (same). See also FORSTMOSER & MEIER-HAYOZ, supra note 31, § 29
n.26, 207; R. KORMANN, DIE WANDELANLEIHE IM SCHWEIZERISCHEN REGHT 76-77
(1965). The specific question of the permissibility of corporate repurchases for defen-
sive purposes has not yet been judicially decided. Cf. Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at
117, 118 (de facto, no restrictive limits exist on repurchases for defensive purposes).
1s Shares reacquired by a corporation are, in most cases, to be reissued with all
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grant preemptive rights with respect to the reissuance or to obtain
shareholder approval therefor to the extent provisions in the certificate
of incorporation do not provide to the contrary. 6
A key difference between bearer and title shares is that while the
identity of a corporation's bearer shareholders need not be made known
to the corporation, title shareholders are required to be registered, by
name and address, in a stock ledger maintained by the corporation.3
As a rule, maintenance of the corporate ledger is the responsibility of
the board of directors."' The registration of banks or other institutions
in the corporate stock ledger as fiduciary or "nominee" title sharehold-
ers is normally permitted only in exceptional situations, subsequent to
discussions with the board. 9
The transfer of rights associated with bearer shares is perfected
vis-a-vis the issuing corporation through presentation of the underlying
share certificate or, with respect to dividend rights to bearer shares,
through submission of the dividend coupon normally attached to the
share certificate. ° On the other hand, while a transfer of rights associ-
ated with title shares is technically completed upon presentation of the
underlying share certificate and proof of an unbroken chain of endorse-
ment,41 most of the thus-transferred rights may be exercised vis-a-vis
due speed ("mit tiinlicher Beschleunigung"). OR, art. 659, para. III.
SO Judgment of the First Civil Division of March 27, 1962, 88 BGE II 98, 103-04
(no shareholder approval required under statutes for corporate stock repurchases and
selective transfer of re-purchased stock to member of majority shareholder group;
neither preemptive shareholder rights nor shareholder rights to equal treatment appli-
cable to reissuance). Until reserve stock is re-issued, all voting rights attaching to such
stock are temporarily suspended. OR, art. 659, para. V.
I OR, art. 685, para. I.
31 See U. BENz, AxTIENBUCH UND AKTIONAERSWECHSEL, 63 SSHW, Vol. 26
(1981) (OR, art. 721, para. II entitles and requires board to maintain corporate ledger
absent statutory provisions to the contrary).
39 See E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 27, 32. Cf. Judgement of the First Civil
Division of December 13, 1955, 81 BGE II 534, 541 (where fiduciary registrations not
statutorily forbidden, registered fiduciary holder entitled to follow voting instructions of
beneficiary owner).
"I OR, art. 967, para. I. See FORSTMOSER & MEIER-HAYOZ, supra note 31, § 39
at 266 n. 14; H. SCHMID, DIE UMWANDLUNG VON INHABER- IN NAMENSAKTIEN
UND UMGEKEHRT 19 (1956); F. BUERGI, KOMMENTAR ZUM ScHWEIZERISCHEN
ZIVILGESETZBUCH, Das Obligationenrecht, Part V b/I, Art. 683 OR, comment 19 at
280 (1957). To enable holders of bearer shares to retain their anonymity, such services
are normally performed by Swiss banks acting under power of attorney.
,1 OR, arts. 684, para. II, 967 paras. I, II. See FoRsTMosER & MEIER-HAYOZ,
supra note 31, § 39 at 266 n. 15. Cf. Judgment of the First Civil Division of Novem-
ber 27, 1961, 87 BGE II 249, 256 (registration does not effect but presupposes transfer
of rights relating to title shares); Judgment of the First Civil Division of June 23,
1964, 90 BGE II 164, 173 (same). Further proof, as to the material entitlement of each
new acquiror (art. 974 OR), is rarely required by Swiss public corporations. See R.
LYK, ENTWICKLUNGSTENDENZEN BE Da UBERTRAGUNG SCHWEIZERISCHER Ko-
TIERTEN NAMENAKTIEN, 51 SAG 9, 10 (1979).
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the issuing corporation only after registration of the new acquiror in
the corporate stock ledger has been effected.4 Such ledger registration
is a mere formality and must be carried out in the absence of certificate
of incorporation provisions to the contrary.4 The Stock Corporation
Act currently places few restrictions, however, on the extent to which a
corporation, through its certificate of incorporation, may empower or
require its board of directors to deny the registration of title share
transfers. 4 A stock corporation's certificate of incorporation may, in-
deed, forbid the transfer of title shares, or require unanimous share-
holder approval for the registration of such transfers.45
No substantial difference exists between the respective rights af-
forded title shareholders and bearer shareholders under the Swiss Stock
Corporation Act, other than those relating to a corporation's right to
restrict the free transferability of title shares but not that of bearer
shares. Because most Swiss corporations have, at least until recently,
generally prohibited the acquisition of their title shares by foreign in-
vestors,46 trade in title shares of such corporations is effectively limited
42 See OR, art. 685, para. IV (persons registered in corporate stock ledger to be
regarded as title shareholders in relationship to corporation); FORSTMOSER & MEIER-
HAYOZ, supra note 31, § 39 at 266-67 n. 15. According to Swiss case law, certain
rights relating to transferred title shares may be exercised by the new acquiror regard-
less of whether registration is complete. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
"' OR, art. 686, para. I; Judgment of the First Civil Division of March 21, 1950,
76 BGE II 51, 67.
4 Limitations exist under OR, art. 686, para. IV, for example, as to registration
denials in the case of involuntary title share transfers, such as through inheritance laws.
See generally P. LuTz, VINKULIERTE NAMENAKTIEN, INSBESONDERE IHR ERWERB
OHNE RECHTSGESCHXFT, 110 SSHW (1988). See also Judgment of the First Civil
Division of May 29, 1984, 110 BGE II 293, 295.
45 OR, arts. 627 1. 8, 684 para. I, 686 para. I OR. Such charter provisions are
rare but not unknown. U. BExz, supra note 38, at 78 n.18.
46 See, e.g., Sind vinkulierte Namenaktien birsenfdhig?, NZZ, Apr. 30-May 1,
1988, no. 100 at 33; Arnold, supra note 32, at 42; Dunant and Pifrard, Regional
Developments: Switzerland, 23 INT. LAW. 571, 573 (1989). Certain major Swiss pub-
lic corporations have recently followed NestlF's precedent in allowing title shares to be
acquired by foreigners. See e.g., Kfinfiig auch Auslainder im BBC-Aktienregister,
NZZ, Mar. 24, 1990, no. 69 at 17 (foreign ed.) (in change of practice under "general
clause," BBC board to grant registration to foreign investors; maximum permissible
ownership of title share capital, applicable to all investors, of seven percent); Ciba-
Geigy vereinfacht die Kapitalstruktur, NZZ Feb. 2, 1990, no. 44 at 13 (foreign ed.)
(board proposal to allow title share ownership by foreign investors; existing two percent
limits on maximum ownership of title share capital and maximum voting of total share
capital to remain in place); Zfirich-Namenaktien auch fur Auslander, Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung [hereinafter FAZ], May 24, 1989, no. 118 at 21 (foreign investors
to be allowed to acquire not only debt but also accompanying options for title shares of
"ZUrich" Insurance Company); Jacobs Suchard Uffnet sich Ausldndern, NZZ, June
22, 1989, no. 142 at 35 (preliminary decision of Nestle rival Jacobs Suchard to alter
board policy prohibiting acquisition of title shares by foreign investors); Schweizer Rick
mit deutlich hherer Ausschiittung, NZZ, Sept. 9, 1989, no. 226 at 33 (foreign inves-
tors to be allowed to acquire up to three percent of Swiss Reinsurance Company title
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to fewer than ten million potential individual and corporate Swiss in-
vestors. Because of the limited trade in Swiss title shares, such shares
are rarely traded over foreign stock exchanges. The more limited de-
mand for, and the greater difficulty in transferring, title shares in com-
parison to bearer shares are reflected in the price relationships between
the two categories of shares, with stock market prices for a Swiss corpo-
ration's title shares generally twenty to fifty percent lower than those
for the corporation's bearer shares.4
The ability of a Swiss public corporation to issue a sufficient num-
ber of restricted title shares to prevent control of the company from
being exercised solely by virtue of bearer shareholdings is limited by
the typically more significant role that bearer shares play in the equity-
financing of Swiss public corporations due to the larger available mar-
ket and generally higher market price for bearer shares.48 According to
conservative estimates, at least half of all holders of Swiss bearer shares
are foreign investors.49 No official statistics are available, however,
since anonymity is the most central feature of bearer shares. Even
though a Swiss corporation may itself be aware of the distribution of its
bearer shares in the hands of foreign shareholders,5" such information,
shares through exercise of newly-issued title share options). But cf. Es bleibt bei
eidgenssischer Beherrschung und begrenzter Beteiligungffir Auslfnder, FAZ, Feb.
27, 1990, no. 41 at 10 (Union Bank of Switzerland to continue to restrict acquisition of
its title shares to Swiss investors).
11 Bbckli, Zankapfel der Aktienrechtrevision: Die Vinkulierung der Namenak-
tien, 60 SAG 149, 152 n.18 (1988). On the day following the announcement of the
Nestl& board decision to allow foreign investors to acquire NestlE title shares, see supra
note 23, the price of Nestle bearer shares in relation to Nestle title shares dropped
drastically. See Nestle hat Unruhe in der Szene ausgelist, Tages-Anzeiger, Nov. 19,
1988, no. 271 at 33 (price difference of 100% reduced to 15%). In the wake of predic-
tions in the weeks following the Nest& decision that other Swiss public corporations
would take similar steps, the price of Swiss bearer shares in relation to Swiss title
shares generally also sunk drastically. See PS als Chance?, Tages-Anzeiger, Dec. 7,
1988, no. 286 at 39 (price difference of 46% reduced to 25%). Cf. Stiirmische Mark-
treaktionen, NZZ, Mar. 24, 1990, no. 69 at 17 (foreign ed.) (on day of announcement
that BBC title shares open to foreign investors, BBC title shares suddenly traded con-
siderably higher than BBC bearer shares); Auf den Spuren von Nestle, NZZ, Feb. 23,
1990, no. 44 at 13 (foreign ed.) (on day following announcement of reversal of prior
Ciba-Geigy board policy not to register foreign acquirers of title shares, difference in
price between Ciba-Geigy's bearer shares and title shares reduced from 25% to 10%).
48 E. TiLLMANN, supra note 26, at 148-49. While PS-not presenting the control
takeover risks associated with bearer shares-has served as an important equity-financ-
ing instrument in the past, the attractiveness of PS as an investment form has declined
significantly in recent months. See PS als Chance?, supra note 47.
49 E. TILLMANN, supra note 26 at 148-49.
" See M. AUBERT, J. KERNEN & H. SCHOENLE, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE
BAN GEHEIMNIS 254 (1978) (as a rule, so long as shareholder identity remains pro-
tected, banking secrecy provisions of Swiss banking law not violated by Swiss deposit
bank's informing Swiss corporation of percentage of its bearer shares held by foreign
investors).
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or other information as to the composition and structure of the corpora-
tion's shareholder base, will be made available to the public only in
exceptional circumstances.51
Despite the lack of precise information regarding the shareholder
composition of Swiss stock corporations, it cannot be overlooked that
many Swiss stock corporations-although "public" in the sense of of-
fering shares listed on a stock exchange and having an accordingly
broad shareholder base-are effectively immune from hostile takeover
due to unevenly dispersed voting control. 2 There exist many so-called
"mixed" public corporations in Switzerland, i.e., corporations in which
voting power is distributed between, on the one hand, a large number
of unrelated shareholders, none of whom possess enough stock to exer-
cise a controlling influence, and, on the other hand, one or several ma-
jor shareholders who effectively wield control through ownership of a
relative or even an absolute majority of issued shares .5 The plentitude
of such mixed public corporations is not entirely surprising in light of
the high number of major business entities in Switzerland that remain
entirely privately-owned.54
2.2. Vinkulierung of Swiss Title Shares
2.2.1. Adoption and limitations on permissibility of Vinklulierung
The existence of provisions in the certificate of incorporation em-
powering a corporation to refuse to register title share transfers is
known as Vinkulierung. 5  Under current law, a Swiss corporation may
51 M. BOEMLE, UNTERNEHMUNGSFINANZIERUNG 156 (6th ed. 1983). Cf. Opposi-
tion gegen die Vinkulierungsbestimmungen der Ciba-Geigy, NZZ, May 5, 1988, no.
104 at 33 (existence of a single shareholder holding more than 2% of Ciba-Geigy's title
shares revealed at shareholders' meeting held to adopt 2% limit on amount of registra-
ble title share capital per investor).
5 M. BOEMLE, supra note 51, at 155; L. HAUNREITER, DIE BETEILIGUNG AN
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN 9 n.7 (1981). Special incentives may nonetheless exist for
launching unfriendly takeover attempts against such corporations. Cf., e.g., infra note
255.
" See M. BOEMLE, supra note 51 (pointing to Jacobs Suchard, Globus, Losinger,
Sika Finanz, and Jelmoli as examples).
Thus, after obtaining 62% voting control of Jacobs Suchard AG from Klaus Jacobs,
U.S. tobacco and food concern Philip Morris Co. was able to launch a successful public
tender offer for the remainingSuchard shares. See Ein kapitaler Paketzuschlag flir
KlausJ. Jacobs, NZZ, July 11, 1990, no. 158 at 33; Philip
Morris hat nun 99.4% an Suchard, Tages-Anzeiger, Sept. 21, 1990, no. 219 at 35.
"See, e.g., Familienunternehmen in der Scheiz" Klub Schweigender Riesen,
SHZ, June 29, 1989, no. 26 at 25 (40 of 100 largest business entities in Switzerland
privately owned; 170 of Switzerland's 500 largest trade, service, and industrial business
entities in private hands).
" The term stems from the Latin word Vinkul, meaning shackle or chain.
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require its board of directors under Vinkulierung provisions to deny
registration with respect to certain stipulated categories of acquisitions,
e.g., those by foreign citizens or those exceeding a threshold number or
percentage of title shares; alternatively, it may grant its board of direc-
tors discretion, again with respect to certain stipulated categories, to
deny title share registration. The Vinkulierung provision broadest in
scope, however, is the so-called "general clause," which grants a corpo-
ration's board of directors discretion to refuse any or all registration
attempts, without having to disclose the grounds therefor.56 For practi-
cal reasons, the general clause is a preferred Vinkulierung provision
among Swiss public corporations5 7 and is normally adopted in combi-
nation with other types of Vinkulierung provisions. 8 As a rule, the
inclusion of a general clause in a corporation's certificate of incorpora-
tion will be accompanied by a provision authorizing the board of direc-
tors to formulate internal policies outlining specific instances in which
registration of title share transfers will be denied. 9
In the absence of corporate charter provisions to the contrary, re-
strictions on the registration of title share transfers may, under current
law, be adopted or eliminated upon approval of a simple shareholder
majority.60 The Swiss Stock Corporation Act does not presently contain
stricter approval requirements explicitly applicable to the adoption of
"post-issuance Vinkulierung", i.e., amendments to the certificate of in-
corporation for either the adoption or sharpening of Vinkulierung ap-
plicable to issued title shares or to a partial or total conversion of issued
bearer shares into title shares subject to Vinkulierung.61 The Swiss
5' OR, art. 686, para. II. See, e.g., David gegen Goliath, supra note 32 (refusal of
Sulzer AG management, without comment, to register ten Sulzer title shares in name of
highly respected Geneva industrialist). The board of directors must nonetheless have
some basis for its refusal under a general clause. See text accompanying infra note 70.
" Die Aktiengesellschaft - ein taugliches Mittel der friedlichen Erbteilungung?,
NZZ, June 27, 1988, no. 147 at 10.
58 The certificate of incorporation of Sandoz AG, for example, currently requires
the board of directors to deny, other than in exceptional cases, the registration of acqui-
sitions in excess of two percent of the company's outstanding title shares, permit the
board to deny the registration of title share acquisitions by foreign citizens or competi-
tors of Sandoz, and further authorize the board, under a general clause, to deny any
and all registration requests. Schdrfere Vinkulierungspraxis, SHZ, Apr. 21, 1988, no.
16 at 37; Sandoz-Vinkulierungsbestimmungen gutgeheissen, NZZ, May 4, 1988, no.
103 at 33.
" Arnold, supra note 32, at 42. Such policies play a significant role in the en-
forcement of title share transfer restrictions through Swiss banks. See infra note 115
and accompanying text.
60 OR, art. 703, para. IV. See Bbckli, supra note 47, at 150.
61 Cf F. VON GODEIN & H. WILHELmI, KOMMENTAR ZUM AKTIENGESETZ
VOM 6 SEPTEMBER 1965, § 68 AktG, comment 10 at 363 (4th ed. 1971) (West Ger-
man stock corporation law (Aktiengesetz) requires approval of all current shareholders
for introduction of post-issuance Vinkulierung) [emphasis added].
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Federal Tribunal has held, however, that post-issuance Vinkulierung
provisions may not be applied retroactively to affect certain vested
rights of current shareholders, including the vested right to remain a
shareholder of the corporation."2 A further limitation on the permissi-
bility of post-issuance Vinkulierung recognized by legal commentators
is the requirement that the degree of Vinkulierung adopted neither un-
duly restrict the freedom of transfer of existing shareholders in light of
the corporate interests at stake, nor treat shareholders unequally in the
absence of sufficient justifying grounds therefor."3
"Lock-up" provisions requiring a supermajority for the elimina-
tion of existing takeover defense protections in the certificate of incorpo-
ration, such as a Vinkulierung provision, may also, in the absence of
provisions in the certificate of incorporation to the contrary, be adopted
upon a simple shareholder majority." Since, as a matter of current law,
takeover defense lock-up provisions themselves may be eliminated only
upon approval of two-thirds of the total issued voting shares,' 5 an ap-
proval standard difficult for Swiss public corporations to achieve, such
lock-up provisions provide an automatic double layer of protection
against a hostile takeover and the replacement of existing management
by the new acquiror 6"
6" Judgment of the First Civil Division of August 30, 1983, 109 BGE II 239, 243
(board refusal to register bearer shareholder as title shareholder subsequent to conver-
sion of bearer shares into restricted title shares impermissible).
63 See Botschaft, supra note 29, § 211.23 at 81; FORSTMOSER & MEIER-HAYOZ,
supra note 31, § 39 at 270 n.28; W. WUERZER, DIE ZUORDNUNG DER RECHTE Aus
GESPALTENEN AxTIEN 42 (1982). For example, this requirement would prevent a cor-
poration from adopting a general clause granting its board unlimited discretion to deny
registration to prevent a control takeover that could be prevented through the adoption
of a less intrusive measure, such as a maximum limit on the number of registrable title
shares.
" OR, art. 703. See FORSTMOSER & MEIER-HAYOZ, supra note 31, § 20 at 153
n.13; Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at 111. No limitations exist with respect to the
percentage of shareholder approval which may be required under such a lockup provi-
sion. Cf., e.g., Sandoz plant Walle gegen Ubernahmeversuche, NZZ, Apr. 22-23,
1989, no. 93 at 33 (charter amendment of Sandoz AG to require three-fourths share-
holder approval for amendment to "general clause"); Verdauung fippiger Markzutaufe
bei Nestle, NZZ, Apr. 27, 1989, no. 97 at 33 (charter amendment to require approval
of three-fourths of represented shares at meeting at which two-thirds of issued voting
share capital is present for alteration of Nestle Vinkulierung and voting rights limita-
tions); Kfinftig auch Ausliinder im BBC-Aktienregister, supra note 46 (charter amend-
ment to require approval of three-fourths of represented shares at meeting with at least
fifty percent of issued share capital present for alteration of newly-proposed limit on
stake in Brown Boveri title share capital).
61 OR, art. 648, para. I (approval of two-thirds of total issued voting stock neces-
sary for elimination of supermajority provisions regarding certain corporate actions);
Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at 112 (OR, art. 648 applies to elimination of lock-up
provisions for Vinkulierung and other voting restrictions in the certificate of
incorporation).
66 See, e.g., David gegen Goliath, supra note 32 (high quorum and supermajority
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Where a corporation's certificate of incorporation makes registra-
tion dependent on the possession of certain qualifications, such as Swiss
citizenship, but does not grant the board of directors discretion to deny
registration in other cases, the board may not refuse to register title
shares of an acquiror possessing the required qualifications. 7 Legal au-
thority is split, however, on the question of whether an acquiror, as
opposed to the selling title shareholder, has standing in such instances
to bring suit compelling registration."8 The sole limitation on the ability
of a board of directors to deny registration when it has been granted
discretion to do so in the certificate of incorporation is the prohibition
against the abusive exercise of legal rights found in Article 2, Para-
graph II of the Swiss Civil Code.69 Legal commentators agree that such
a prohibition is theoretically violated by the arbitrary refusal of a board
of directors to register title shares, i.e., a refusal not objectively justified
as being in the interests of the corporation."0 To date, however, there
have been no known instances where a board of directors' exercise of its
discretion to deny registration under the so-called general clause has
been challenged in court. It is also unclear whether an acquiror of title
shares, as opposed to the selling shareholder, enjoys standing to chal-
lenge a discretionary denial of registration.71
approval requirements proposed by Nestle board of directors for takeover defense re-
quirements not, as a practical matter, attainable). Cf. Kampf gegen die "ewige" Stim-
mrechtsbeschrdnkung bei Conti-Gummi, Handelsblatt, Feb. 26, 1990, no. 48 at 26
(lock-up provision adopted by West German Corporation, in 1989 to require approval
of three-fourths voting share capital present at meeting where three-fourths of total
share capital is represented for elimination of maximum voting limit; provision cur-
rently being challenged under West German law as impermissible "eternal barrier to
change" to the detriment of future shareholders).
67 Judgment of the First Civil Division of March 21, 1950, 76 BGE II at 68
(permitting suit against corporation for fulfillment of legal duty to register insofar as
registration not restricted under certificate of incorporation). See FORSTMOSER &
MEIER-HAYoZ, supra note 31, § 39 at 267 n.19.
68 The question has yet to be decided by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. Cf. W.
WUERZER, supra note 63, at 114 (no standing for acquiror); with F. BUERGI, supra
note 40, art. 686 OR, comment 30 at 316 (acquiror should also have standing); FORST-
MOSER & MEiER-HAYoz, supra note 31, § 39 n. 19 at 267 (acquiror has legal claim to
registration).
6" Schweizerisches Zivilgesetzbuch, vom 10. Dezember 1907 (SR 210)[hereinafter
ZGB]. See FoRsTmoSER & MEIER-HAYOZ, supra note 31. With regard to certain
involuntary share transfers where a board must accompany such a registration denial
with a purchase offer, see supra note 44.
71 See, e.g., Botschaft, supra note 29, § 211.21 at 80; U. BENz, supra note 38, at
79. Cf. Judgment of the First Civil Division of March 21, 1950, 76 BGE II at 70
(benefit of doubt as to arbitrariness of registration decision to be given to board of
directors).
7' The question was expressly left open by the First Civil Division of the Swiss
Federal Tribunal in its Judgment of March 21, 1950, 76 BGE II at 69. No consensus
exists with regard to this question among legal commentators. See W. WuERZER, supra
note 63, at 114 (citing authorities).
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The general lack of litigation in this area can be attributed to,
among other things, the considerable difficulties in proving the arbitrar-
iness of a board refusal of registration, especially with respect to a re-
fusal without the naming of grounds therefore, under a general
clause,7" and, more generally, the extreme reluctance of Swiss courts to
interfere with internal corporate affairs.7 Legal commentators agree,
however, that protection against the inner or outer infiltration of a cor-
poration is a circumstance justifying a denial of registration,74 and the
speculative purchase of stock by an investor has been singled out as an
example of such inner infiltration. 5
2.2.2. Legal and practical effect of Vinkulierung
The Stock Corporation Act provides that only the holders of title
shares registered as such in the corporate stock ledger may be regarded
as title shareholders in relation to the corporation.7 6 In a series of rul-
ings under this provision, the Swiss Federal Tribunal has held that an
acquiring title shareholder, regardless of his eligibility for registration,
is entitled to possession of the underlying title share certificate and,
more importantly, to collect declared dividends and to exercise certain
creditor-related rights with respect to the acquired title shares; con-
versely, all remaining rights attaching to title shares, particularly the
rights to vote and to exercise preemptive shareholder rights, remain
with the selling title shareholder until registration of the acquiring
shareholder is effected. 7 Thus, a corporation's failure to register a title
7 See Botschaft, supra note 29, § 211.21 at 80 (objective grounds justifying a
denial of registration may be easily manufactured during litigation). See also U. BENz,
supra note 38, at 79.
71 See FORSTMOSER & MEIER-HAYOZ, supra note 31, § 37 at 258 n.14. The
impermissibility of contingent fee arrangements under Swiss law, the requirement that
the losing party in a lawsuit bear the court and attorney fees of his opponent, and the
requirement that shareholder plaintiffs provide an advance deposit, in many cases pro-
hibitively high, to cover a corporation's fees in the case of ultimate defeat also play roles
in deterring shareholder litigation. Cf, e.g., David gegen Goliath, supra note 32 (ap-
peal to Federal Tribunal by Nestl6 shareholder plaintiffs against Vevey Circuit Court's
demand for advance deposit of half a million Swiss francs); Der Streit um die Nestli-
Kapitalerh~hung, NZZ, Mar. 14, 1990, no. 60 at 15 (foreign ed.) (deposit required to
be made; shareholder plaintiffs chose wrong course of appeal).
7' See Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at 115 n.91 (citing authorities).
75 Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at 115 n.91; F. BUERGI, supra note 40, art. 686
OR, comment 23 at 313.
76 OR, art. 685, para. IV.
7 Judgment of the First Civil Division of June 11, 1957, 83 BGE II 297, 307-8
(financial rights transferred to new acquirer); Judgment of the First Civil Division of
July 7, 1964, 90 BGE II 235, 239 (transferred financial rights limited to concrete
creditor-related claims); Judgment of the First Civil Division of May 10, 1983, 109
BGE 11130, 137 (preemptive shareholder and voting rights remain with ledger share-
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share transfer effectively converts the acquiring shareholder into a
holder of non-voting stock with an ordinary, non-privileged dividend
return. Voting, preemptive, and other corporate membership rights re-
lating to the title shares may still be exercised by the selling share-
holder, even though such a "ledger shareholder" no longer bears the
financial risks normally borne by holders of voting stock.""
Although an unwanted acquiror could attempt to evade the force
of Vinkulierung provisions through the use of so-called "straw men" -
unobjectionable fiduciary purchasers of Swiss nationality_- to apply
for registration, the practically unlimited right of a corporation's
board of directors to request documentation in support of a registration
application represents a powerful tool both to delay the course of an
attempted takeover and to investigate instances of suspected fiduciary
relationships.8" Moreover, the concealment of a fiduciary relationship
with respect to a title share registration application, as well as a regis-
tration attempt by an investor ineligible to be a title shareholder, is
prohibited under the catch-all prohibition on the abusive exercise of
legal rights found in Article 2, Paragraph II of the Swiss Civil Code."1
Current law provides no time frame for taking corporate action on
a registration request; moreover, in connection with registration appli-
holder); Judgment of the First Civil Division of April 19, 1988, 114 BGE II at 64, 66
(reaffirming prior decisions; contractual relinquishment of voting rights by ledger
shareholder must be express).
78 FORSTMOSER & MEIER-HAYoz, supra note 31, § 39 at 268 n. 23. Certain title
shares of Usego-Trimerco-Holding AG, for example, acquired by Swiss investor Karl
Schweri over six years ago, representing two-thirds of the company's total issued title
shares, were until recently registered in the name of the selling shareholders-Swiss
banks-and regularly voted in favor of Usego board proposals. Gegen unternehmer-
ische Willkiir, Tages-Anzeiger, Feb. 2, 1988, no. 26 at 29. See Curti erwirbt Usego-
Namenaktien von Schweri, NZZ, Mar. 1, 1990, no. 49 at 17 (foreign ed.) (Usego title
shares recently purchased from Schweri by investment firm).
9 Cf Sulzer/ Tettamenti: Strohmpanner entdeckt!, SHZ, Nov. 12, 1987, no. 46
at 3, 15 (members of seventy-person syndicate acquiring 35% of Sulzer AG issued
share capital include, among others, housewives, interior decorators, doctors, lawyers
and trustees).
80 See, e.g., Es wird kalt um den Aktionair, supra note 12 (practice of Swiss
boards of directors to request personal tax return information from title share registra-
tion applicants to detect-on the basis of individual financial resources-possible con-
cealed fiduciary relationships). Cf "La Genevoise" nur fir Genfer, NZZ, Aug. 4,
1988, no. 179 at 25 (title share registrants required under "La Genevoise" certificate of
incorporation to reveal personal income and wealth information and obtain legal certifi-
cation thereof).
"i See, e.g., Judgment of the First Civil Division of January 10, 1983, 109 BGE
II 43, 46 (voting agreement with unregistered acquiror prohibited under ZGB, art. 2,
II and OR, arts. 686, 692); Judgment of the First Civil Division of July 7, 1964, 90
BGE II at 245 (same); Judgment of the First Civil Division of December 13, 1955, 81
BGE II at 539 (same). Cf David gegen Goliath, supra note 32 (as condition of regis-
tration, Von Roll AG title shareholders required to forego voting rights in the event of
a subsequent alienation of shares).
[Vol. 11:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol11/iss3/1
PROTECTION AGAINST HOSTILE TAKEOVER
cations made by title share acquirors, the board of directors may re-
quire the acquiror to provide any supporting documentation regarding
the acquiror's identity, financial position, or any other information
deemed relevant.82 On the other hand, a corporation may not under
current law require the selling or acquiring title shareholder to apply
to the corporation for registration of the transfer of title shares or oth-
erwise report such transfers to the corporation.88 Under a convention
on title share transfers adopted by the Swiss Bankers' Association
(SBA) in 1961,84 member banks are required to report transfers of re-
stricted title shares to signatory corporations and take steps to ensure
that title share acquirors apply for registration to the issuer in accor-
dance with relevant stock exchange recommendations.85
Convention 61, however, is a mere gentlemen's agreement with no
enforceable sanctions for the breach of its provisions,88 and its notifica-
tion and registration provisions are often only loosely adhered to.87 Be-
cause of the lack of effective notification and registration application
deadlines for title share transfers, and as a consequence of the increased
absolute number of title shares restricted by Vinkulierung, a "gray
market" has developed, both on and off Swiss stock markets, in the
trade of essentially severed dividend rights to title shares, i.e., title
shares that have been sold but not yet registered in the name of a new
owner. Assuming the silent agreement of stock market participants not
to report the first acquiror of restricted title shares to the relevant cor-
poration for approval - or at least not for several months - dividend
rights to such shares may be sold and resold many times over, indepen-
dent of the voting and other rights relating to the shares, without the
8" Arnold, supra note 32, at 42. The catch-all prohibition of ZGB, art. 2, para. II
serves as a limit on the board's otherwise unlimited right to request documentation. Cf
supra note 69 and accompanying text.
83 See OR, art. 680, para. I (only duty which may be imposed on shareholders is
duty to pay in full for subscribed shares). See also U. BENZ, supra note 38, at 56.
84 Uebereinkommen der Schweizerischen Bankiervereinigung betreffend Han-
dinderungen von vinkulierten Namenaktien bestimmter schweizerischen Gesellschaften
[Convention of the Swiss Bankers' Association Regarding Transfers of Title Shares of
Certain Swiss Corporations Subject to Vinkulierung], Apr. 6, 1961, confirmed by (be-
stitigt durch) Circular No. 2901, Aug. 26, 1985, para. 3 [hereinafter Convention 61]).
The SBA is a private organization whose membership includes the overwhelming ma-
jority of Swiss banks. See E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 55. Over 60 leading Swiss
public corporations, on the other hand, have also agreed to cooperate with the provi-
sions of Convention 61. Sind vinkulierte Namenakien barsenfdhig?, supra note 46.
8 See, e.g., U. BENz, supra note 38, at 127 (application for registration within 14
days after transfer effected required under § 18V of the Usanzen der Zilrich Ef-
fektenb~rse [Usages of the Zurich Stock Exchange]).
88 E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 55.
87 See B~ckli, supra note 47, at 151.
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knowledge of the issuing corporation. 8 Alternatively, in many cases
dozens of transfers will be effected, again without knowledge of the
issuing corporation, during the weeks or even months which may pass
before a board of directors ultimately approves or denies an acquiror's
application for registration.89
Estimates that as much as forty percent of Rinsoz & Ormond's
issued title shares was voted by so-called ledger shareholders at a recent
shareholders' meeting illustrate the breadth of the ever-increasing gray
market trade in dividend rights to restricted title shares in Switzer-
land. 0 Although several Swiss corporations have adopted certificate of
incorporation provisions to the effect that no rights relating to title
shares may be acquired without corporate approval, such provisions
alone have had little impact on the extent of this gray market trade.9"
2.3. Preferred-Voting Title Shares
Under the Swiss Stock Corporation Act, the voting strength of
Swiss shares is normally determined in accordance with par value.92
However, a Swiss stock corporation may, assuming the existence of au-
thorization in the certificate of incorporation, adopt a "per share" vot-
ing system and issue title shares preferred as to voting strength over
other issued shares by virtue of a lower par value.93 No limits apply
under current law as to either maximum ratios of preferred-voting
shares to ordinary shares or maximum allowable differences in respec-
tive par values.94
Preferred-voting shares grant their holders voting strength dispro-
portionate to required capital investment. Nonetheless, an issuance of
88 Bbckli, id.; FORSTMOSER & MEIER-HAYOZ, supra note 31, § 39 at 268 n.20.
, Aktienrechtsreform: Raider, Super-oder Bad Man?, SHZ, Apr. 7, 1988, no. 14
at 3.
9o Rinsoz & Ormond vor Gericht, Tages-Anzeiger, Aug. 13, 1988, no. 187 at 33.
Cf. Riickzug ins Rtduit?, supra note 7 (25% of issued voting shares of Sulzer AG
consist of title shares sold but not registered in name of new owner).
91 Bbckli, supra note 47, at 151 n.15. See FORSTMOSER & MEIER-HAYOZ, supra
note 31, § 39 at 269 n.24. Where a split in rights relating to title shares is prohibited
under the certificate of incorporation and such title shares are embodied by couponless
one-way share certificates, however, gray market trade in dividend rights may be effec-
tively blocked. Bickli, supra note 47, at 151 n.16.
'2 OR, art. 692, para. I.
" OR, arts. 627, 1. 10, 693, paras. I, II. A Swiss stock corporation may not issue
shares with the same par value but expressly varying as to voting strength, as is al-
lowed under various U.S. state corporate laws. See Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at
115; FORSTMOSER & MEIER-HAYOZ, supra note 31, § 20 at 157 n.27.
" See Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at 115. See also Botschaft, supra note 29, §
202.3 at 43 (under current practice, preferred-voting shares with 100 Sfr. par value
and ordinary voting shares with 1000 Sfr. par value).
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preferred-voting shares is ill-suited as a defensive measure in response
to an ongoing takeover contest under current law. Because of the high
standard of shareholder approval required for the issuance of preferred-
voting rights through a recapitalization, 5 the success of a board propo-
sal for such an issuance is uncertain."6 Further, title shares held by
shareholders dissenting or abstaining from a shareholder resolution
which adopts preferred-voting shares-conceivably representing as
much as one-third of a corporation's issued capital-are automatically
freed from applicable transfer restrictions in the certificate of incorpo-
ration for a six-month period following the adoption of such a resolu-
tion."7 Thus, during the six-month Vinkulierung "escape period" fol-
lowing shareholder approval of a preferred-voting share issuance, a
hostile acquirer could purchase title shares of dissenting or abstaining
shareholders. This could be accomplished through an attractive public
purchase offer as well as through secondary market purchases. The ac-
quirer may require title share registration with respect to the acquired
shares prior to expiration of the six-month period, notwithstanding any
applicable Vinkulierung provisions that would normally bar such
registration.'
2.4. Voting Rights Limitations
In addition to restrictions on the transferability of title shares, the
Swiss Stock Corporation Act further permits restrictions in the certifi-
cate of incorporation on an investor's ability to exercise voting rights,
either directly or through representatives, with respect to issued
shares-including bearer shares-exceeding a certain number or per-
centage of a corporation's issued share capital or a certain percentage of
" Under OR, art. 648, para. I, the issuance of preferred-voting shares through a
recapitalization requires approval of at least two-thirds of a Swiss stock corporation's
total issued voting share capital, a requirement typically difficult for Swiss public cor-
porations to fulfill. See Botschaft, supra note 29, § 214.5 at 95.
"' See, e.g., Die "La Suisse" volflihrt einen Riickzieher, NZZ, May 26, 1988,
no. 120 at 33 (in face of strong resistance on part of Swiss media, shareholders, and
deposit banks, "La Suisse" Insurance Company board forced to retract proposal for
issuance of preferred-voting shares to Swiss Bank Corporation giving 40% voting power
to such bank in exchange for 12.6% capital investment; Swiss Bank Corporation would
have been required to refrain from exercising control with respect to the shares, but
assured of 5.2 million Sfr. gain on later sale of shares).
'" OR, art. 648, para. II (six months following required publication of corporate
resolution in Schweizerisches Handelsamtblatt (official publication of the Swiss Trade
Office)).
" See M. BRUNNER, STREIFZUG DURCH DIE STATUTEN SCHWEIZERISCHER PUB-
LIKUMSAKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN, 444 Abhandlungen zum schweizerischen Recht, 50-
51 (1976).
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the total shares represented at a shareholders' meeting. 9 In the absence
of certificate of incorporation provisions requiring a stricter approval
threshold, a simple shareholder majority suffices for approval of such a
voting right limitation. 00 Voting rights attaching to shares in excess of
a voting right limitation are suspended indefinitely.101 Typical levels
for voting right limitations appear to range from three per cent to ten
per cent of total issued share capital10 '
In the context of a hostile takeover attempt through purchases of
bearer shares, voting right limitations - as opposed to limitations on
the number or percentage of title shares registrable per investor - of-
fer only limited protection to a Swiss target corporation. Although the
circumvention of a voting right limitation through the transfer of shares
is prohibited under Article 691, Paragraph 1 of the Swiss Stock Corpo-
ration Act, 03 a corporation is nonetheless required to permit voting
rights to be exercised by each person in possession of either a bearer
share certificate 04 or proof of deposit of a bearer share certificate,
without inquiry into the particulars of the bearer's right to posses-
sion.105 Thus, despite the existence of an applicable voting right limita-
tion, a would-be acquiror need only distribute the necessary number of
bearer share certificates among various "straw men" prior to a share-
holders' meeting in order to reach a desired voting result.'0 6 A
mandatory 20% voting right limitation prescribed under the predecessor
of the current Swiss Stock Corporation Act was eliminated during stock
law revisions in 1936 precisely because the goal of the 20% limitation
- the frustration of undesirably large voting blocks - had proven to
9 Arts. 627 line 10, 692 para. II OR. See M. BRUNNER, id. at 76.
100 Art. 703 OR. See Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at 116.
101 FORSTMOSER & MFEIR-HAYOZ, supra note 31, § 20 at 154 n. 15.
102 See, e.g., Weichere Vinkulierung von Nestle-Aktien, supra note 23 (NestlE vot-
ing right limitation of 3%); Hero]Jacobs: Nach dem "Takeover " das "Giveover",
SHZ, Jan. 29, 1987, no. 5 at 21 (Hero Conserven 10% voting right limitation); Ciba-
Geigy vereinfacht die Kapitalstruktur, supra note 46, (Ciba-Geigy 5% voting right
limitation).
103 Judgment of the First Civil Division of December 18, 1945, BGE 71 11 277,
280 (violation of Art. 691 OR when purpose of share transfer is not to effect property
transfer but to allow recipient to exercise voting rights).
1" The statutes of many Swiss public corporations require that bearer share cer-
tificates be placed in deposit with an approved deposit bank a certain number of days
prior to each shareholders' meeting. See A. ScHETT, STELLUNG UND AUFGABEN DER
VERWALTUNG EINER AG BEI DER DURCHFUHRUNG DER ORDENTLICHEN GV, Reihe
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, vol. 9, 38 (1978).
105 Art. 689 IV OR. See N. STUDER, DIE QUASIFUSION 47 (1974).
108 N. STUDER, supra note 105, at 54. See also M. BRUNNER, supra note 98, at
76 (voting right limitations rely more on proper behavior and voluntary self-reporting
of individual shareholders than on possibility of enforcement).
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be easily circumventable.10 7 It appears, however, that a highly restric-
tive voting right limitation, requiring several hundred or thousand
"cstraw men" in order to be circumvented, could effectively hinder con-
trol takeover attempts by unwanted investors."'
2.5. Share Acquisition Barriers Facing Foreign Investors
2.5.1. Title share purchase barriers
Transfer restrictions on title shares through Vinkulierung re-
present without a doubt the most important and useful takeover defense
tool currently available to a Swiss corporation.109 However, the effec-
tiveness of Vinkulierung as a protection against unfriendly takeover is
accidental."'
The original impetus for the issuance of title shares by Swiss pub-
lic corporations was the need to prove that such corporations were not
under Nazi control. Certain Swiss public corporations relying on
bearer shares as the predominant or exclusive corporate equity-financ-
ing instrument ran the danger of being placed on an "enemy list"
maintained by Allied forces during World War II through their inabil-
ity to identify controlling shareholders and offer proof of non-Nazi con-
trol.1 ' Thus, many Swiss public corporations introduced title shares
during World War II and restricted ownership of such shares to Swiss
investors, 1 2 while others, including Nestle, followed suit in the late
1940's and 1950's, concerned that it might once again become necessary
to prove that control lay in Swiss hands."1 8
107 E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 117 (citing Art. 640 111 of the Swiss Code of
Obligations of March 30, 1911).
108 Cf V. M. Gisler, Neuer Raider in der Wirtschaftsszene, Tages-Anzeiger,
Sept. 13, 1988, no. 213 at 33 (restriction on exercise of voting rights with respect to
shares exceeding .001% of Gewerbebank Baden's issued share capital)(holder of 45% of
bank's issued share capital unable to defeat board proposal for stock split requiring
two-thirds majority shareholder approval).
' Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at 106.
110 Title share restrictions have been included in the certificates of incorporation
of many Swiss public corporations for well over thirty years, long before the first recent
wave of hostile takeover attempts. Cf M. STEHLi, AKTIONXRSCHUTZ BEI FUSIONEN
224 (1975)(first meaningful hostile takeover attempt against Swiss corporation in
1971).
"I1 See, e.g., M. BRUNNER, supra note 98, at 49-50; Vinkulierte Namenaktien:
Kastrierte Titel, SHZ, Feb. 19, 1987, no. 8 at 14; Tribune: Zwang zur Vinkulierung?,
SHZ, June 16, 1988, no. 24 at 57. As many as 1500 Swiss corporations and single-
man firms were thus blacklisted. Id.
112 See e.g., Tribune: Zwang zur Vinkulierung?, supra note 111 (Sandoz AG,
"Wintherthur" Insurance Company, Swiss Reinsurance Company); H. SCHMID, supra
note 40, at 13 & 91 n.92 (Ziba AG, Gebr. Sulzer AG).
11 See Vinkulierte Namenaktien: Kastrierte Titel, supra note 111.
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The SBA adopted Convention 61 in 1961, following judicial rec-
ognition of a severance between dividend rights and voting rights relat-
ing to unregistered title shares, as insurance against the possibility that
the nationality of a Swiss corporation in a future international conflict
would be judged from the viewpoint not only of voting control but also
of ownership of financial rights attaching to the issuer's shares.""' Con-
vention 61 operates in most cases to prevent non-Swiss investors, as an
initial matter, from acquiring unregistered title shares subject to Vinku-
lierung. This result is achieved because Swiss title shares are rarely
sold by banks or broker dealer firms which are not SBA members, and
since under Convention 61 SBA members must pre-screen each
purchase order for title shares subject to Vinkulierung and reject per se
ineligible purchaser applicants, this in effect bars non-Swiss investors
as they are normally per se ineligible.11 5
Unregistered Swiss title shares nonetheless have been known to
reach the hands of foreign investors, either through SBA members act-
ing in disregard of the convention's non-binding recommendations, 1 6
through non-SBA traders,1 1 7 or pursuant to negotiated transactions. s
Although the mere holding of unregistered title shares does not alone
represent an effective means of pressuring a corporation into eliminat-
ing or altering Vinkulierung provisions which prevent a foreign inves-
114 Convention 61, supra note 84, at Introduction. But cf. In Bankengeschdft
herrschen noch idyllische Verhdltnisse, Tages-Anzeiger, Dec. 16, 1988, No. 294 at 33
(interview with Dr. Markus Lusser, President of the Swiss National Bank)(A Swiss
corporation wishing to take over a foreign corporation does not ask itself if its actions
will endanger American or British characters)("Wenn ein schweizerisches Un-
ternehmen ein anderes im Ausland iibernehmen will, fragt man sich auch nicht, ob
man den britischen oder amerikanischen Charakter gefihrdet").
115 Convention 61, supra note 84, at 1 (non-Swiss purchasers are generally
deemed per se ineligible for title share registration pursuant to provisions in the certifi-
cate of incorporation or board policy). Would-be purchasers are required to fill out an
application form stating name, nationality and whether the shares are being purchased
in a fiduciary capacity; the form is then checked against the Vinkulierung provisions
and board policies of signatory issuing corporations, distributed to SBA members in the
form of a periodically updated looseleaf notebook. U. BENz, supra note 38, at 132.
""s See e.g., V. M. Gisler, Differenzen in der Bankiervereinigung, Tages-
Anzeiger, Dec. 9, 1988, no. 288 at 33 (sales of Swiss title shares to various ineligible
foreign acquirors by five SBA members).
"I7 See e.g., Auslandsinteresse Surprise Baloise, NZZ, Jan. 23/24, 1988, no. 18
at 33 (unclear whether 13% parcel of Baloise-Holding title shares purchased by ineligi-
ble foreign investors acquired through SBA or non-SBA member).
178 See e.g., Vinkulierungswillkiir bei "La Genevoise", NZZ, Aug. 3, 1988, No.
178 at 27 (14% parcel of "La Genevoise" Insurance Company unregistered title shares
sold in negotiated deal to ineligible West German insurance firm). The frequency with
which foreign investors have been able to acquire Swiss title shares through the assis-
tance of "straw men," i.e., Swiss fiduciary purchasers willing to conceal on an SBA
application form a foreign investor's beneficial interest in the title shares to be acquired,
is unclear.
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tor's registration, such shareholdings may form part of a long-term
waiting strategy,'1 9 or may be coupled with substantial bearer share
purchases and eventual attempts to alter or eliminate such provisions or
policies through the calling of a special shareholders' meeting. On the
other hand, the prospect of a foreign acquiror holding a significant
number of a Swiss public corporation's unregistered title shares on a
long-term basis may be sufficiently unsettling as to spur the corpora-
tion's board of directors into arranging for an acceptable third party to
purchase the unregistered title share parcel.120
2.5.2. Restrictions on acquisition of Swiss real estate
Pursuant to a Swiss federal law commonly referred to as Lex
Friedrich, 2' a foreign investor with a place of residence or incorpora-
tion outside of Switzerland is required to apply for and obtain a can-
tonal permit prior to the acquisition of Swiss real estate. 22 The acqui-
sition by a foreign investor of a controlling interest in a Swiss
corporation, one-third or more of whose total assets consist of Swiss
real estate, constitutes an "acquisition of real estate" within the mean-
ing of Lex Friedrich and requires that a permit be obtained with re-
spect to each piece of real estate owned by such a corporation. 2 ' A
controlling interest in a Swiss corporation is presumed to exist for pur-
poses of Lex Friedrich in the event that one or more foreign investors,
taken together, are either able to exercise more than one-third of the
aggregate voting rights, or possess more than one-third of the com-
pany's total issued shares and PS capital."' Cantonal authorities may
I'l See e.g., Vinkulirungswilkur bei "La Genevoise", supra note 118 (purchase of
13% "La Genevoise" unregistered title shares by West German insurance firm possibly
part of build-up of strategic long-term waiting position).
120 See e.g., infra note 128.
121 Federal Act of December 16, 1983, Regarding the Acquisition of Real Estate
by Persons Outside Switzerland (Bundesgesetz vom 16. Dezember 1983 iiber den
Erwerb von Grindstiicken durch Personen im Ausland (SR 211.412.41) [hereinafter
BEwG]). This law is accompanied by federal regulations. See Regulations of October 1,
1984, Regarding the Acquisition of Real Estate by Persons Outside Switzerland (Ver-
ordnung vom 1. Oktober 1984, iber den Erwerb von Grundstiicken durch Personen im
Ausland (SR 211.412.411) [hereinafter BEwV]).
122 BEwG, arts. 2, 5.
123 BEwG, art. 4, % I, § d. For purposes of this section, a corporation's "total
assets" are required to be measured in accordance with actual rather than disclosed
value. Id.
124 BEwG, art. 6, II, §§ a, b. While acquisitions by a foreign investor of bearer
shares are thus required to be included in calculations of a "controlling interest" in a
Swiss corporation, as a practical matter, such acquisitions will escape notice insofar as
Swiss public corporations are normally unaware of the identity of bearer shareholders.
See A. BRUESCH, Aufdeckung und Verfolgung von Umgehungsgeschaften, in DAs
BUNDESGESETZ UEBER DEN ERWERB VON GRUNDSTUECKEN DURCH PERSONEN IM
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grant permits only in certain restricted situations, pursuant to federal
law and regulations, and investors who obtain or use Swiss real estate
parcels in violation or circumvention of Lex Friedrich may, among
other things, find themselves required to sell the real estate at a public
auction under a court order.125
The level of investment in Swiss real estate by Swiss public corpo-
rations is typically high, and the possible application of Lex Friedrich
must therefore be taken into consideration by foreign investors contem-
plating a control takeover attempt against a Swiss target corporation. In
extreme cases, where the value of the Swiss target corporation's real
estate investments approaches one-third of its total assets, the real estate
permit requirements of Lex Friedrich will effectively protect that cor-
poration against the threat of foreign takeovers.126 Because accurate
figures regarding the actual value of real estate investments held by a
Swiss public corporation in relation to the actual value of its assets will
typically not be disclosed either to foreign investors or to corporate
shareholders, 127 uncertainty as to the possible application of Lex Fried-
rich is created. This uncertainty provides a Swiss public corporation's
board with an unverifiable ground for opposition to a control takeover
attempt that may involve foreign investors, a ground for opposition
whose importance may increase if certain proposed revisions to the
Stock Corporation Act are ultimately adopted. 28
AuSLAND 69, 100 (1985)(Referate der Informationstagung vom 19. April 1985 in
Luzern).
125 BEwG, ch. 3, arts. 8-14 & 27 2; BEwV, ch.2, arts. 3-14; See Judgment of
the Second Public Law Division of March 25, 1988, BGE 114 Ib 11, 15 (revocation of
real estate permit under BEwG, art. 25, I; use of land not contemplated under
permit).
128 Cf. Arnold, supra note 32, at 43 ("there is no need to say that a foreign raider
will not get . . . a permit for acquiring a Swiss corporation [that is viewed as an
'acquisition of real estate' under Lex Friedrich]").
127 See generally infra notes 249-67 and accompanying text. Cf. W. KuPPER,
STILLE RESERVEN UND AKTIONXRSINTERESSEN 3 (1967)(investments consisting of
millions of square meters of real estate booked in balance sheets of certain Swiss public
corporations at pro-memoria value of 1 Sfr.).
128 See infra note 188 and accompanying text. Cf. V. C. Biichi, Scheiterte "La-
Suisse"-Uebernahme durch Tettamenti an Lex Friedrich?, Tages-Anzeiger, Aug. 10,
1988, no. 184 at 31 ("La Suisse" board's refusal to register hostile bidder based on
lurking uncertainty as to existence of foreign investors and possible application of Lex
Friedrich); Surprise Baloise, supra note 117 (acquisition of 25% packet of unregistered
title shares of Basel holding company from foreign investors necessary to avoid possible
application of Lex Friedrich).
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3. EFFECTIVENESS OF AVAILABLE TAKEOVER DEFENSES IN
RECENT TAKEOVER CONTESTS
3.1. Post-Issuance Vinkulierung
The concept of Vinkulierung for Swiss public corporations has
evolved in recent years into an approval device chiefly employed to im-
munize a target corporation's board of directors against the threat of an
unfriendly takeover posed by an investor, regardless of the investor's
country of origin or incorporation.129 Actual attempts by various inves-
tors in the recent past to acquire voting control of Swiss public corpora-
tions, including corporations without issued title shares subject to
Vinkulierung, have been, although often profitable, almost uniformly
unsuccessful. These attempts have been unsuccessful in large part be-
cause of the wide array of post-issuance Vinkulierung measures availa-
ble to a target corporation under the Swiss Stock Corporation Act."
One such measure, for example, is the total or partial conversion
of bearer shares into title shares through a stock split and the imposi-
tion of Vinkulierung on such title shares.1 3 Necessary shareholder ap-
proval for these partial conversions has even been obtained subsequent
to the launching of takeover attempts against several Swiss target cor-
porations with issued share capital consisting exclusively of bearer
shares.13 2 Swiss target corporations under siege by unwanted acquirors
have also effected complete conversions of bearer shares into title shares
that are subject to Vinkulierung. This represents a more drastic mea-
sure to prevent a control takeover in light of its impact on the equity-
129 See W. Schluep, Lauterkeitsrechtliche Aspekte des "Unfriendly Takeovers",
60 SAG 89, 93 (1988)(true motive of post-issuance Vinkulierung is often protection of
management against its forced replacement through new majority shareholders).
130 Shareholder voting mechanisms and corporate disclosure policies contributing
to the adoption of target corporation defense strategies are discussed generally infra
notes 196-272 and accompanying text.
131 Such a conversion necessitates shareholder approval of a provision in the certif-
icate of incorporation authorizing conversions generally (Art. 627 line 7 OR), as well
as of the specific conversion and the Vinkulierung provisions, each of which actions
currently requires a simple shareholder majority in the absence of stricter approval
requirements in the certificate of incorporation. Art. 703 OR.
"" See, e.g., Grossaufmarsch von Hero-Aktiondren an der GV, NZZ, Apr. 24,
1985, no. 95 at 18 (split of each Hero AG bearer share into one bearer share and two
title shares subject to Vinkulierung in response to acquisition of 25% of issued bearer
shares by Saudi-Arabian investors); Gewerbebank Baden in ruhigerem Fahrwasser,
NZZ, Feb. 17, 1989, no. 40 at 33 (split of each bearer share into one bearer share and
two title shares approved at special shareholders' meeting of Gewerbebank Baden AG
in response to surprise acquisition of 47% bearer share parcel by unwanted investor;
sufficient shareholder approval obtained only as result of unusual voting right
limitation).
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financing potential of the target corporation. 3 s Because bearer share-
holders are likely to balk at trading-in their bearer shares for restricted
title shares, which typically have lower stock market prices,134 board
proposals for conversions of bearer shares into restricted title shares
have often been accompanied by proposals for the issuance of "loyalty
premiums" to shareholders in the form of rights to subscribe to new PS
or bearer share issuances at attractive prices.1 35
Another form of post-issuance Vinkulierung for preventing a con-
trol takeover by an unwanted investor is the imposition or temporary
reduction of limits on the maximum amount of title shares which may
be registered with respect to any one.investor or investor group. Such a
reduction may be achieved by amending the certificate of incorpora-
tion 36 or, if the board of directors has already been granted discretion
to adjust registrable title share limits, can be put in place quickly dur-
ing a control takeover contest, without seeking shareholder approval.
1 37
Because the prohibition on the retroactive application of post-issuance
Vinkulierung measures arguably does not extend to pending title share
registration applicants, newly-reduced limits on registrable title shares
I" See, e.g., Das Abwehrdispositiv der Solothurner Handelsbank, NZZ, Sept.
24/25, 1988, no. 223 at 39 (complete conversion of Solothurner Handelsbank bearer
shares into title shares subject to Vinkulierung adopted in response to market purchases
of 20% of issued bearer shares by unknown acquiror); Verteidigungswillige Hero-Ak-
tiondire, NZZ, Mar. 11, 1987, no. 58 at 19 (complete conversion of Hero AG bearer
shares [those remaining after 1985 stock split] into restricted title shares; prompted by
acquisition of 31% of issued share capital by Hero rival Jacobs Suchard).
I" Cf. Hero/Jacobs: Nach dem "Takeover" das "Giveover", supra note 102 at
21, 22 (drastic price drop in Hero bearer shares subsequent to notice of board propos-
als for complete conversion of bearer shares into title shares subject to Vinkulierung).
18I See, e.g., Grossaufinarsch von Hero-Aktionaren an der GV, supra note 132
(partial conversion of Hero bearer shares coupled with 5 million Sfr. issuance of bearer
shares to existing shareholders at par value); Klare Holdingstrukturffir die Publicitas,
NZZ, June 1, 1988, no. 125 at 34 (1987 split of each Publicitas AG bearer share into
one bearer share and two title shares subject to Vinkulierung accompanied by compen-
satory issuance of PS with preemptive rights); Verteidigungswillige Hero-Aktionare,
supra note 133 (complete conversion of Hero bearer shares accompanied by issuance of
PS with attractive preemptive rights).
18I See, e.g., "La Genevoise" nurfir Genfer, supra note 80 (special sharehold-
ers' meeting to reduce title share registration limit from 1,450 to 200 shares per inves-
tor); Das Abwehrdispositiv der Solothurner Handelsbank, supra note 133 (special
shareholders' meeting to impose registration limit of 1000 title shares per investor).
187 See, e.g., Umfangreiche Privatplacierung der Bank Leu, NZZ, Nov. 18, 1988,
no. 270 at 33 (board-imposed limit on registrable title shares of Bank Leu AG reduced
from 5% to 1% of title share capital shortly prior to private placement of reserve stock
for purposes of securing control); Surprise Baloise, supra note 117 (board-imposed
limit on number of registrable title shares of Baloise Holding reduced from 8,000 to
1,000 shares in response to title share acquisitions by unknown foreign investors); Hero
Conserven: Frische Konfiture aus Lenzburg, SHZ, Feb. 26, 1987, no. 9 at 21 (total
100,000 issued Hero shares; limit on number of registrable title shares temporarily
reduced to 400 subsequent to bearer share purchases by unwanted acquiror).
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have provided much-needed grounds for denial of pending applications
of unwanted title share acquirors.' 8 Conversely, when a board of di-
rectors has discretion to allow exceptions to a limit in the certificate of
incorporation on the maximum amount of registrable title shares, it has
proven to be an effective means of allowing a friendly acquiror to se-
cure control during a takeover contest.1"'
A third form of post-issuance Vinkulierung used as a defensive
measure is the issuance of title shares and/or bearer shares to an ac-
ceptable third party who would be subject to the following limitations:
the title shares would be restricted through post-issuance Vinkulierung;
any applicable preemptive shareholder rights would be excluded; and
the third party would be required to refrain from exercising control
with respect to the shares pursuant to a standstill agreement.140 A pri-
vate reissuance of "reserve" shares, including restricted title shares,
represents an especially effective method of warding off the threat of a
hostile takeover because, absent certificate of incorporation provisions to
the contrary, a reissuance of reserve shares does not require either
shareholder approval or the granting of preemptive rights.1 4" Such a
11" See, e.g., Georg Fischer AG, Schaffhausen: Informationsarme Informationen,
SHZ, Apr. 30, 1987, no. 18 at 27 (limit on number of registrable title shares of Georg
Fischer AG reduced by board from 10,000 to 2,000 in response to perceived takeover
attempt; pending applicants informed amounts exceeding limit would not be registered);
Kampf um Sulzer-Eintragungspraxis: Das Syndikat wird ungeduldig!, SHZ, Feb. 18,
1988, no. 7 at 7 (limit on number of registrable title shares reduced ,by Sulzer board
from 3,000 to 1,000 during hostile takeover contest); Riickzug ins Rhduit?, supra note
7 (reduced Sulzer title share registration limit applied to pending registration
applicants).
139 See, e.g., Rechtfertigungsversuche bei der "La Suisse", NZZ, Aug. 10, 1988,
no. 184 at 29 (charter amendment reducing amount of "La Suisse" registrable title
shares from 5% to 2% of title share capital, with board-retained discretion to permit
exceptions; provision crucial in ensuring success of subsequent white knight tender of-
fer). The Swiss Federal Tribunal is currently examining whether a board of directors
may issue "treasury" title shares to a Swiss deposit bank, for the purpose of satisfying
title share options to be exercised in the future by debenture holders, where the deposit
bank could vote such shares in favor of management proposals without regard to an
otherwise applicable statutory restriction on registrable title shares. See Streit Nes-
tld-Canes vor Bundesgericht, NZZ, Aug. 26-27, 1989, no. 197 at 34; Der Streit um
die Nestl-Kapitalerhhung, supra note 73.
140 See, e.g., Gegenangriff der Rinsoz & Ormond, NZZ, Nov. 8, 1988, no. 261 at
34 (special shareholders' meeting of Rinsoz & Ormond, a Vevey-based tobacco firm, for
approval of share issuance, excluding preemptive rights, to a Swiss investor group for
purposes of securing control; issuance would reduce percentage of Rinsoz & Ormond
share capital held by partially unknown investors from 40% to 30%); Gewahrte Eigen-
standigkeit der Rinsoz & Ormond, NZZ, May 13/14, 1989, No. 109 at 39; Cf. Par-
tizipationsscheine: Schutz oder Chance?, SHZ, Nov. 10, 1988, no. 45 at 19 (private
placement for purpose of securing control represents merely short-term solution; fails to
address underlying problem of undervalued stock).
141 See, e.g., Umfangreiche Privatplacierung der Bank Leu, supra note 137 (pri-
vate placement by Bank Leu AG to investor group of reserve stock consisting of 90,000
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measure presupposes that the reissued title shares are already subject to
Vinkulierung and that the target corporation has sufficient surplus cap-
ital and/or surplus reserves on hand to repurchase enough of its own
shares to dilute the shareholdings of the unwanted acquiror.142
3.2. White Squire and White Knight Arrangements
In the event that Vinkulierung-related measures fail to dilute or
weaken sufficiently a would-be acquiror's position, a Swiss target cor-
poration's board of directors may choose to rid itself of the unwanted
investor by arranging for a "white squire" to purchase the threatening
share package. The target corporation obtains a standstill agreement
from the white squire in exchange for, among other things, its agree-
ment to register the white squire as title shareholder.143
For a Swiss target corporation, a white squire purchase arrange-
ment is preferable to a traditional "greenmail" corporate repurchase of
an unwanted acquiror's stock for several reasons. First, a corporate re-
purchase would require the target corporation to have on hand suffi-
cient surplus capital and/or reserves to purchase the typically expensive
share packages of unwanted acquirors. 144 Second, while the votes at-
taching to repurchased shares are suspended until the shares are reis-
sued by a corporation, with white squire purchases, these votes may be
effectively exercised by the corporation's board pursuant to a standstill
agreement.
1 45
restricted title shares and bearer shares, representing 20% of total issued share capital,
in response to heavy market purchases of bank's title shares by unknown acquirors;
terms of standstill agreement not publicized).
142 It is not altogether free from doubt that corporate repurchases for the purpose
of defending against control takeovers are permissible. See supra note 34.
143 See, e.g., Tempordr erh5hte Beteiligung des SBV an der Basler-Versicherung-
sgruppe, NZZ, Mar. 3, 1988, No. 52 at 33 (13% of Biloise-Holding issued share
capital purchased from unidentified foreign investor group by Swiss Bank Corporation;
title shareholdings of bank registered pursuant to board-granted exception to registrable
title share limit; under standstill agreement, bank forbidden from exercise of control
and required to sell shares within next three years to board-approved purchasers);
Gewerbebank Baden in ruhigerem Fahrwasser, supra note 132 (47% of Gewerbebank
Baden issued share capital purchased by BBC Brown Boveri AG from unwanted inves-
tor; BBC participation to be gradually reduced pursuant to sales to board-approved
purchasers).
144 Cf, e.g., Gewerbebank Baden in ruherigem Fahrwasser, supra note 132
(profit from sale by unwanted acquiror of Gewerbebank Baden share package to white
squire of between 25 and 30 million Sfr.). Furthermore, the legality of corporate repur-
chases for takeover defense purposes under current law is not entirely free from doubt.
See supra note 34.
14 See supra note 143. See also Rey schliesst Sulzer fester in die Arme, NZZ,
Apr. 5, 1989, no. 78 at 33 (investor Werner Rey required under standstill agreement to
support politics and proposals of Sulzer AG for a period of six years in return for
registration of title shares purchased from unwanted investor representing 20% of Sul-
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On the other hand, white squire arrangements pose the danger
that the new "senior partner" will develop her own ideas and replace
the management that called her in, assuming the white squire pur-
chaser is neither required to reduce nor prohibited from increasing her
shareholdings under the terms of the relevant standstill agreement. 1"
Although a Swiss corporation may prevent this from happening
through a management buy-out of an unwanted acquiror's shares and
registration of the acquired shares directly in the names of corporate
management, 47 such an arrangement is not desirable because of both
the need to mortgage corporate assets to obtain necessary capital to buy
out the unwanted investor, and the existence of possible tax disadvan-
tages under Swiss law.""8
Would-be acquirors are not prevented through Vinkulierung from
making public tender offers for restricted title shares.1" 9 Such tender
offers are of necessity, however, either made contingent on board assur-
ances of title share registration or, assuming the bidder's share owner-
ship is sufficient to demand the calling of a shareholder's meeting, 5 ' on
the elimination of Vinkulierung policies or provisions in the certificate
of incorporation preventing the bidder's registration. In the first in-
stance, the target corporation's announcement of its intent not to regis-
ter title shares acquired by the hostile bidder will usually be enough to
defeat the hostile takeover attempt.15 In the second instance, the ability
zer-issued share capital).
146 Cf, e.g., Rey schliesst Sulzer fester in die Arme, supra note 145 (acquisition of
additional 10% of Sulzer title shares by Werner Rey one year after "white squire"
purchases amounting to 20%; current 30% ownership by Rey renders standstill agree-
ment undertakings to support board policies and proposals for next five years illusory);
Sulzer etwas schwach auf der Eigenkapitalbrust, Tages-Anzeiger, Apr. 25, 1989, no.
95 at 34 (Sulzer board proposal to elect Rey as director).
14 See, e.g., Hero-Conserven: Frische Konfitilre aus Lenzburg, supra note 137
(31% Hero title share packet acquired from unwanted Swiss investor by top members
of Hero management in first large-scale management buy-out in Switzerland).
148 See, e.g., Tschini, Lohnen sich Management-Buy-Outs?, SHZ, Sept. 22, 1988,
no. 38 at 15 (tax disadvantages especially significant in case involving the buy-out of
foreign investor shareholdings).
149 See, e.g., Rechtfertigungsversuche bei der "La Suisse", supra note 139 (Au-
gust 1988 hostile tender offer for "La Suisse" shares more than four times above De-
cember 1987 stock market prices); Rinsoz & Ormond vehement gegen die Denner-
Offerte, NZZ, May 7-8, 1988, no. 106 at 41 (hostile tender offer for Rinsoz & Ormond
shares more than two times the price of shares to be issued in private placement for
purposes of securing control).
1o See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
1 See, e.g., Rinsoz & Ormond vehement gegen die Denner-Offerte, supra note
149, at 41 (registration of contingent tender offer bidder Denner AG vehemently re-
jected by board of Rinsoz & Ormond); Ubernahme Poker auch um Warteck, Tages-
Anzeiger, Sept. 12, 1988, no. 212 at 33 (the possibility of registering title shares ac-
quired pursuant to the contingent tender offer was rejected by the Warteck board).
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of a hostile bidder to eliminate or alter restrictive Vinkulierung provi-
sions through the avenue of a special shareholders' meeting may be
effectively blocked through the existence of Vinkulierung lock-up
provisions.
15 2
Alternatively, in the absence of Vinkulierung lock-up provisions,
or in the event that a contingent offer appears attractive enough to lure
a sufficient number of shareholders either into voting to eliminate
Vinkulierung provisions at a special shareholders' meeting, or into tak-
ing action themselves to demand a special shareholders' meeting for this
purpose, 5 ' then a Swiss target corporation's board of directors may
announce its willingness to supply an acceptable buyer for shareholders
wishing to sell their shares.154 In extreme cases, the target corporation's
board of directors may even arrange for an acceptable "white knight"
to enter the bidding, agreeing to acknowledge the white knight bidder
as title shareholder. A target board's promise of registration of a white
knight in such instances may force the target's shareholders to content
themselves with a bid substantially lower than that offered by the hos-
tile bidder.
1 55
4. TAKEOVER DEFENSES UNDER PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SWISS
STOCK CORPORATION ACT
4.1. Regulation of Vinkulierung
Efforts to revise the Swiss Stock Corporation Act have been under-
... An increasing number of Swiss public corporations have in recent months
adopted Vinkulierung lock-up provisions, the elimination of which under current law
requiris the approval of two-thirds of the total issued voting shares. See supra notes
64-66 and accompanying text.
15I But see Den Aktionarsblues hoch gesungen und dabei froh gezecht, supra
note 21 (blaming certain Swiss shareholding voting mechanisms in part for the failure
of "La Suisse" shareholders to call a special meeting to adopt a resolution requiring
title share registration of hostile bidder with the two-thirds shareholder approval re-
quired under the certificate of incorporation for alteration of Vinkulierung provisions).
See generally infra notes 196-272 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Konsum Verein Zi~rich lehnt neues Coop-Angebot ab, Tages-
Anzeiger, May 29, 1989, No. 121 at 35 (Konsum Verein Ziirich (KVZ) board oppos-
tion to second, higher tender offer of Coop Schweiz for KVZ shares; KVZ willing to
supply acceptable buyer for KVZ shareholders desiring to sell shares).
155 See, e.g., Eintragungsbegehren Tettamantis abgelehnt, NZZ, Aug. 9, 1988,
No. 183 at 25 (hostile bidder's tender offer for "La Suisse" title shares was identical to
the white knight's competing tender offer except that it offered 2,000 Sfr. per share
more; board assurances of registration were given to white knight but withheld from
hostile bidder; the hostile tender offer was ultimately withdrawn in light of probable
failure); Rechtfertigungsversuche bei der "La Suisse", supra note 139 (statement of
"La Suisse" general director) (shareholders should be content with comparatively lower
profit resulting from acceptance of white knight bid).
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way for over twenty years. 56 The Swiss Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives are currently in substantial agreement with the Swiss Federal
Council upon many areas of the revised Stock Corporation Act. 57
However, recent events, including the recent wave of hostile takeover
attempts and Nestle's decision to allow its title shares to be acquired by
foreign investors, have subjected the scope of Vinkulierung to close re-
examination. 58 At the forefront of current discussion is, among other
things, whether the new law should expressly countenance the refusal
of title share registration on the basis of foreign citizenship... as well as
whether it is appropriate to allow title shares subject to Vinkulierung
to be listed on Swiss stock exchanges.'
4.1.1. Federal Council proposals
According to the 1983 draft proposals for a revised Stock Corpora-
tion Act of the Swiss Federal Council, 6 ' Swiss public corporations
could deny the registration of title share transfers, first, when an "im-
portant ground," expressly listed in the corporation's certificate of in-
corporation, was implicated.' 2 Even when not expressly listed in a cor-
poration's certificate of incorporation, the goals of competition or
maintaining the "Swiss character of the corporation" would in them-
selves be deemed by law as sufficient grounds to justify such a denial of
11 Das Aktienrecht vor letzten Feilenstrichen, NZZ, Oct. 1-2, 1988, No. 229 at
33. See A. MEIER-HAYOZ & P. FORSTMOSER, GRUNDRISS Dzs SCHWEIZERISCHEN
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS 188 (1984).
1"7 Das Aktienrecht vor letzten Feilenstrichen, supra note 156. The Senate
(Stiinderat) and the House of Representatives (Nationalrat) constitute the two houses of
Swiss parliament; the Federal Council (Bundesrat) is the Swiss executive branch.
15 Eine Denkpause in der Aktienrechtsreform?, supra note 19.
'5 See Unternehmen muss iiber Auslinder entscheiden, SHZ, Dec. 15, 1988,
No. 50 at 9 (bank and industry representatives recommend deleting legal presumption
of validity of denials based on nationality in Stock Corporation Act; revised Act should
allow refusals based on "important grounds" to be included in the certificate of incor-
poration insofar as charter authorizations of denials based on nationality do not create
possible conflicts with international agreements).
16O See Die Namenaktien dekotieren?, NZZ, Apr. 19, 1989, no. 90 at 41 (title
shares subject to Vinkulierung not suitable for trade on stock exchanges).
1.1 The 1985 revision proposals of the Swiss House of Representatives adopted in
its Resolution of October 3, 1985 (Beschluss des Nationalrates vom 3. Oktober 1985)
[hereinafter NaRE 1985] followed in substantial form the proposals of the Federal
Council with regard to permissible grounds for Vinkulierung. Thus, NaRE 1985 pro-
visions will be referred to in this Section only to the extent they deviate from the Fed-
eral Council proposals.' In September 1990, however, the House of Representatives
substantially revised the approach to Vinkulierung taken under NaRE 1985. See infra
notes 185-195 and accompanying text.
"62 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 685b, t 2 line 3 at 229. Cf NaRE 1985, supra
note 161, art. 685b 1 (ground in certificate of incorporation "sufficient to justify the
denial in light of 'corporate purpose and composition of the shareholder base' ").
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registration.63 Second, if granted the discretion to do so in the certifi-
cate of incorporation under a general clause, the board of directors of a
public corporation could refuse the registration of title share transfers
without stating its reasons on the condition that the corporation offered
to purchase the title shares in question. The price of the shares would
be based on their stock market value at the time of the registration
attempt.
16 4
Under the Federal Council proposals, all rights to title shares sub-
ject to Vinkulierung would remain with a selling shareholder until the
issuing corporation had granted its approval for the transfer, after
which all rights to the shares would be transferred to the acquiror.'65
The corporation's failure to deny registration within three months after
receipt of an acquiror's registration application would be deemed to
constitute approval of the application, resulting in the immediate trans-
fer of all rights to the shares to the acquiror168 On the other hand,
should the issuing corporation deny the transfer request within the
three month time period, to the extent such denial was not based on an
"important ground," the corporation would then be obliged to purchase
the title shares in question from the selling shareholder.1,6 7 Arguably, a
selling shareholder could determine in advance, from the relevant arti-
cle of the Stock Corporation Act or the certificate of incorporation,
whether or not a particular prospective acquiror would be ineligible for
registration based on an important denial ground. 68 Nonetheless, the
three month waiting period would arguably create an undesirable de-
gree of uncertainty with repect to all title share trades, in particular
with respect to anonymous trades effected over Swiss securities markets.
Because of the difficulties associated with undoing a stock market trans-
action, even only a few days after its execution, the approval waiting
period proposed by the Federal Council has been strongly criticised as
unworkable with respect to listed title shares of public corporations." 9
163 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 685 2, lines 1 & 2, at 229. Cf Backli, supra
note 47, at 155-56 (criticizing legal presumption of the importance of denial based on
nationality or incorporation as de jure discrimination against foreign investors).
16 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 685b 77 1, 4 at 229.'
165 Id., at art. 685c % 1 at 230. Cf NaRE 1985, supra note 161, at art. 685c 711
(provides for the same as Botschaft, but only in the absence of certificate of incorpora-
tion provisions to the contrary). Prior to a corporation's decision as to registration, a
selling shareholder would be able to both collect dividends and vote with respect to the
title shares in question.
I6 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 685c % 3 at 230.
167 Id., art. 685b, % 1 at 229.
168 Bbckli, supra note 47, at 153. "Important grounds" would consist exclusively
of grounds specified in a corporation's certificate of incorporation or presumed suffi-
cient by law.
16 See, e.g., Aktienrechtsreform: Eine (fast) verpasste Chance?, SHZ, Sept. 15,
[Vol. 11:3
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol11/iss3/1
PROTECTION AGAINST HOSTILE TAKEOVER
4.1.2. Senate Proposals
As a result of objections raised by stock market participants,
among others, to the revision proposals of the Swiss Federal Council
and subsequently, by the House of Representatives, draft Stock Corpo-
ration Act revisions adopted by the Senate in 198817' contain special
rules applicable to the acquisition, on a Swiss stock exchange, of title
shares subject to Vinkulierung.
First, the Senate proposals would provide that all rights to re-
stricted title shares acquired over a stock exchange would, in theory, be
transferred immediately to the acquiror. Nonetheless, the acquiror
would not be permitted to exercise any of the transferred rights, includ-
ing the right to declared dividends, until acknowledged by the corpora-
tion as the title shareholder.17 ' The Senate proposals also provide
mandatory time periods applicable to each step in the registration pro-
cess for title shares. Banks effecting restricted title share trades over a
stock exchange would be required to report the trades immediately to
the issuing corporation, acquirors would be required to apply for regis-
tration within 15 days after such trades, and the issuing corporation
would be required to deny or grant registration within 20 days after a
registration request. 2
Second, refusing to register title shares acquired over a stock ex-
change would be permissible under the proposals only if pursuant to
provisions in the certificate of incorporation requiring refusals based on
the nationality of the title shares acquiror; if the limitations in the cer-
tificate of incorporation on the maximum percentage or number of reg-
istrable title shares were exceeded; or if the acquiror had failed to ap-
ply for title share registration within a legally-prescribed period.
17 1
Rights to dividends declared by an issuer, suspended because of a per-
missible registration denial, would extinguish one year after becoming
due and would be payable if the denied acquiror has not first succeeded
in reselling the title shares to another acquiring party eligible for regis-
1988, no. 37 at 13 (interview with Prof. P. Forstmoser). See also Namenaktien: Tilck-
erischer Handel, SHZ, Feb. 13, 1986, no. 7 at 9.
170 Resolution of the Swiss Senate of September 26, 1988 (Beschluss des Stnder-
ates vom 26. September 1988 [hereinafter StRE 1988]).
171 Id. at art. 685f, 1. Cf Bckli, supra note 47, at 154 (labelling Senate formu-
lation a "normative euphemism" but necessary with respect to stock market transac-
tions). Thus, although a denied acquiror had paid the full price for title shares, upon
denial of registration in permitted instances, the acquiror would be permanently pre-
vented from exercising rights relating to such shares and would thereby be forced to
recoup his financial outlay through a "forced sale" to a third party, inevitably resulting
in a financial loss for the denied acquiror. Id.
171 StRE 1988, supra note 170, art. 685e.
173 Id. at art. 685d, 11 1, 2.
1990]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
tration.174 For all other registration denials of title share transfers ef-
fected over Swiss stock exchanges, such as those based on a general
clause, a public corporation would have to couple the denials with an
offer to repurchase the title shares for the higher of either the stock
market price at the time of the denial, or the original purchase price,
plus interest and costs."75
For title shares of public corporations not traded on Swiss stock
exchanges, a stock corporation would be allowed, as under the propos-
als of the Federal Council and the House of Representatives, to deny
registration based on an "important ground" specified in the certificate
of incorporation, such as staying within the corporate purpose, main-
taining the economic independence of the corporation or, finally, main-
taining the composition of the shareholder constituency. In the absence
of such an "important ground," the corporation could deny registration
by accompanying the denial with an offer by either the corporation, a
shareholder or a third party to acquire the title shares in question
based on the stock market value at the time of the registration applica-
tion."'6 Ownership of all rights to title shares acquired other than over
a Swiss stock exchange would, as under the Federal Council proposals,
remain with the seller, effectively requiring the undoing of the relevant
acquisition transaction in the event of a denial based on an "important
ground.
17 7
4.1.3. House of Representatives proposals
In September 1990, as part of the Swiss legislative enactment pro-
cess, the Swiss House of Representatives addressed the differences be-
174 Id. at art. 685f, 1 2. Further, a corporation's certificate of incorporation could
provide that until unregistered title shares were sold to eligible acquirors, suspended
voting rights relating to the title shares must be divided proportionally among registered
title shareholders. Id. at art. 685f, 7 3.
175 Id. at art. 685d, 1 3. Thus, an acquiror of title shares over a stock exchange
denied registration on the basis of non-publicized grounds would be ensured of recoup-
ing, at the very least, his full investment.
17 Id. at art. 685d, W7 1, 2, 4. Approximately half of all trades in listed shares of
Swiss stock corporations are developed and executed outside the stock exchanges,
through purely internal bank or other transactions. Bckli, supra note 47, at 154 (cit-
ing N. SCHMID, SCHWEIZERISCHES INSIDERSTRAFRECHT 238 (1988)). Thus, under the
proposals, public corporations would be forced to continually apply two sets of Vinku-
lierung rules, depending on the method by which the listed title shares had been ac-
quired. Further, the increasingly important area of telephone and computer trade in
non-listed Swiss shares would not be subject to the standardized transfer rules applica-
ble to listed title shares. Id. at 154.
17 But cf Judgment of the First Civil Division of April 19, 1988, supra note 33,
at 65 (trades in listed Swiss shares developed and executed outside stock exchange are
based on same principle of immediate acceptance of price offer as trades in listed shares
over stock exchanges).
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tween its 1985 proposed revisions to he Stock Corporation Act pertain-
ing to Vinkulierung and those proposed by the Swiss Senate in 1988.1"8
The House of Representatives resolved, first, that stricter Vinku-
lierung rules should apply to all acquistions of restricted title shares
listed on a securities exchange, regardless of whether the particular
trade was effected privately or over a securities exchange.1 "9 Second,
because banks would normally not play a role in private acquisitions of
restricted title shares, the House of Representatives voted further to
drop the requirement that banks effecting trades in registered title
shares be required to report such trades to the issuing corporation. 8
Next, the House of Representatives concluded that a public corpo-
ration's refusal to register restricted title shares would be permissible
only if 1) provisions in the certificate of incorporation on the maximum
percentage of number of registrable title shares were exceeded (as
under the Senate proposals), or 2) such refusal were based on a certifi-
cate of incorporation provision allowing a corporation to refuse to regis-
ter persons or entities as title shareholders if doing so could prevent the
corporation from being able to produce "certain legally-required
proof." 8 The most obvious application of the latter, somewhat oblique
Vinkulierung ground would be in the context of Lex Friedrich, so that
a Swiss public corporation could refuse to register a non-Swiss investor
as title shareholder based on its view that the corporation might not
otherwise be able to satisfy the Swiss nationality requirements gov-
erning Swiss real estate ownership prescribed by Lex Friedrich.'82
With respect to the Vinkulierung of title shares of non-public cor-
porations, the House of Representatives resolved to eliminate the so-
called "escape clause" which allows non-public corporations to refuse
registration of undesirable title share acquirors even if the refusal was
not authorized by an "important ground" listed in the certificate of in-
corporation, providing the corporation itself purchased the title shares
in question. 8" It was argued that such an escape clause would have
"78 Unless otherwise noted below, the House of Representatives made no changes
to the regulation of Vinkulierung adopted under NaRE 1985. See supra notes 161-169
and accompanying text.
179 See Differenzbereinigung beim Aktienrecht, NZZ, Sept. 18, 1990, no. 216 at
25, 26. The questions of whether trades effected before and after official securities ex-
change hours would be viewed as being "effected over a securities exchange" was thus
rendered moot.
180 Id. at 26.
181 Id.
182 See supra notes 123-128 and accompanying text. During the parliamentary
debate, this provision was criticized as concealed discrimination against non-Swiss enti-
ties incompatible with the European Community's prohibition on nationality-based dis-
crimination. Differenzbereinigung beim Aktienrecht, supra note 179, at 26.
i6 Id.
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encouraged stock market manipulators to seek quick, short-term profits
at the expense of the corporation."'
4.2. Other Revision Proposals Affecting Takeover Defenses
Other aspects of the Stock Corporation Act revision proposals,
which do not deal directly with the scope or impact of Vinkulierung,
would also affect the conduct of hostile takeovers under future law.
Legislative revision proposals would, for example, render the adoption
of post-issuance Vinkulierung during the course of an ongoing takeover
contest much more difficult, requiring the approval of two-thirds of all
represented voting shares," 5 together with a simple majority of the to-
tal par value of represented voting shares. Further, while lock-up pro-
visions, including those applicable to Vinkulierung and voting right
limitations, would continue to be allowed under the revision proposals,
the automatic "double lock-up provision" of current law would be
eliminated. 8 In addition, under the Senate proposals a lock-up provi-
sion could only be adopted by the same supermajority shareholder ap-
proval required under the lock-up provision itself.'
The revision proposals would, moreover, arguably affect a public
corporation's ability to rid itself of an unwanted acquiror by placing a
ceiling of 20% of the corporation's issued share capital on the maxi-
mum amount of title shares which could be repurchased, as an alterna-
tive to registration, in the case of a denial not based on a standardized
or otherwise authorized Vinkulierung ground.' An even lower ceiling
of 10% of issued share capital would be placed on corporate repur-
chases in all other situations, including repurchases for defensive pur-
poses.'89 A corporation's ability to effect a private placement issuance to
184 Id.
"I Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 704, 1, line 3, at 237; NaRE 1985, supra note
161, at art. 704, 1, line 3; StRE 1988, supra note 170, at art. 704, % 1, line 3.
188 Cf. supra note 65 and accompanying text. A simple shareholder majority (art.
701 OR) would be required to eliminate Vinkulierung lock-up provisions in the ab-
sence of stricter approval requirements in the certificate of incorporation, rather than
the approval of two-thirds of the total issued share capital currently required under art.
648, 1 OR.
187 StRE 1988, supra note 170, at art. 704, % lb.
188 Botschaft, supra note 28, art. 659 2, at 220; NaRE 1985, supra note 161,
art 659, 1 2; StRE 1988, supra note 170, art 659, 1 2.
18I Thus, doubts as to the permissibility of repurchases for defensive purposes
under current law would be put to rest. Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 659, 1, at 220;
NaRE 1985, supra note 161, art. 659, 1; StRE 1988, supra note 170, art. 659, 1.
See Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at 117, 118. As a practical matter, the repurchase
ceilings would seldom come into play during a takeover contest with respect to title
shares if Swiss public corporations were to continue the current practice of imposing
certificate of incorporation limits on the maximum amount of registrable title shares
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a third party for purposes of securing control during a takeover contest
would also, arguably, become more difficult under the Stock Corpora-
tion Act revision proposals. Under the proposals, preemptive share-
holder rights would no longer be allowed to be excluded under the cer-
tificate of incorporation, but would instead require in each case a
specific shareholder resolution excluding them1.. as well as a require-
ment that no shareholder be arbitrarily favored or disfavored through
such specific exclusion."" The Senate proposals would additionally im-
pose a shareholder approval standard for the exclusion of preemptive
rights stricter than that under current law,' and further require that
there be "important grounds" for each preemptive rights exclusion.
Protection against possible control takeovers is not included in the spe-
cific list of situations legally presumed to give rise to such an "impor-
tant ground."'93
On the other hand, the Stock Corporation Act revision proposals
would lessen the difficulties faced by Swiss public corporations under
current law in obtaining shareholder approval for the introduction of
preferred-voting shares. The proposals would do so by requiring an
approval quorum based on the number of represented shares rather
than on the number of total issued shares, as under current law."
Although the revision proposals would also require that the par value,
and therefore voting power, ratio of preferred-voting shares to ordinary
voting shares not exceed ten, this ratio typically is not exceeded, as a
matter of current practice, by Swiss corporations with issued preferred-
voting shares."'
substantially below 10% of issued share capital, see supra notes 136-39, since a denial
based on the exceeding of such a limit would not trigger a duty to extend a repurchase
offer.
1'0 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 652b, 1 3, at 213; NaRE 1985, supra note 161,
art. 652b, 2; StRE 1988, supra note 170, art. 652b, 1 3.
191 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 653c, 2, at 216; NaRE 1985, supra note 161,
art. 653c, 1, line 2; StRE 1988, supra note 170, art. 652b, 2.
"I" StRE 1988, supra note 170, art. 704, 1 1, line 5b (approval of two-thirds of
represented shares, together with simple majority of par value of all represented
shares). Cf. supra note 30 and accompanying text.
'19 StRE 1988, supra note 170, art. 652b, 1 2. Cf supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
19 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 704, 1, line 2 at 237; NaRE 1985, supra note
161, art. 704, 11, line 2; StRE 1988, supra note 170, art. 704, 1, line 2 (approval by
shares whose aggregate par value constitutes absolute majority of aggregate par value of
all represented shares, together with approval of two-thirds majority of total repre-
sented shares).
199 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 693, 1 2 at 232; NaRE 1985, supra note 161,
art. 693, T 2; StRe 1988, supra note 170 art. 693, Il. See supra note 94. The fact
that the revision proposals contain a grandfather clause which would apply to already-
issued preferred-voting shares with a par value ratio in excess of ten has not failed to
draw the attention of Swiss legal corporate planners. Cf Lang and Messineo, Recent
1990]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
5. Swiss SHAREHOLDER VOTING MECHANISMS
5.1. In General
It cannot be claimed that the takeover defense tools available to
Swiss target corporations, with the possible exception of Vinkulierung,
are significantly more restrictive than similar defense tools permitted
under the laws of other countries. 9 Moreover, it is theoretically possi-
ble for a Swiss investor, and, to a lesser extent for a non-Swiss investor,
to acquire voting control of a Swiss target corporation whose title
shares are subject to Vinkulierung, or where voting right restrictions
apply, through tools of shareholder democracy similar to those available
in Great Britain and the United States.
An investor seeking voting control of a Swiss corporation could, for
example, acquire the necessary number of the corporation's bearer
shares and, if possible, registered title shares, either to call a special
shareholders' meeting or to submit shareholder proposals to be voted on
at the annual shareholders' meeting. Under the Swiss Stock Corpora-
tion Act, the right to call a special shareholders' meeting may be exer-
cised by shareholders representing at least 10% of a corporation's issued
equity capital.' 9" According to unanimous legal authority, this 10% re-
quirement is also a prerequisite for the right to submit a shareholder
proposal.1 98 In the absence of lock-up provisions in the certificate of
incorporation, a simple shareholder majority would suffice for the
developments in Takeovers and Pending Proposals for Regulatory Changes, in M.
KATZ AND R. LOEB, Acquisitions and Mergers 1988 909, 957 (1988) (disparate vot-
ing rights in management and other groups friendly to management raise the concern
that management will insulate itself from accountability to shareholders and remove
threat of hostile takeover).
9I See, e.g., Meier-Schatz, supra note 31, at 118 (certain hostile takeover de-
fenses available under U.S. state corporate laws are impermissible under Swiss stock
corporation law); Feindliche Firmeniibernahmen in der Schweiz, NZZ, Nov. 7, 1989,
no. 259 at 33 (according to renowned Swiss corporate law professor, fewer takeover
defense measures available to average Swiss corporation than to its U.S. counterpart).
Cf Grilnes Lichtfir Nestlg-Angebot an Rowntree, NZZ, May 26, 1988, no. 120 at 33
(preliminary opinion of U.K. Trade and Industry Minister Young finding legal take-
over conditions in U.K. and Switzerland comparable); Eine Denkpause in der Ak-
tienrechtreform, supra note 19 (comparative investigation by NZZ business correspon-
dents of hostile takeover defenses available under laws of 12 major foreign
marketplaces).
197 Art. 699, 3 OR. See, e.g., Coop Schweiz will Konsum Verein ilbernehmen,
FAZ, Apr. 26, 1989, No. 119 at 19 (special shareholders' meeting of KVZ called by
10% KVZ shareholder Coop Schweiz to eliminate Vinkulierung provisions preventing
registration of title shares acquired through Coop tender offer for KVZ shares). Art.
699, 4 OR provides a court procedure for the calling of a shareholders' meeting in the
event the board refuses to do so.
"" The Stock Corporation Act is silent on the question, which has not yet been
decided in court. See A. SCHETT, supra note 104, at 18, 65-66 (citing authorities).
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adoption of a resolution, e.g., to eliminate or alter Vinkulierung provi-
sions preventing the investor's registration, to convert restricted title
shares into bearer shares, or to issue bearer shares to the investor in a
private placement.1" Alternatively, a would-be acquiror could make an
attractive public tender offer for the title shares of a target corporation,
in order to motivate interested title shareholders into calling a special
shareholders' meeting for the adoption of a resolution requiring the
hostile bidder's registration.2 "
As has been suggested during the Nesti/Rowntree takeover con-
test,20 1 however, shareholders of Swiss corporations distinguish them-
selves by an unusual willingness to adopt board-proposed takeover de-
fenses. They have done so despite the strident opposition expressed by
shareholder groups and Swiss media 02 despite the adverse effect, in
some cases, of the proposed defensive measures on the market value of
issued shares,203 and despite the fact that, occasionally, substantial
holdings of voting shares may already lie in the hands of hostile ac-
quirors. 20 " The apparent readiness of shareholders of Swiss stock cor-
porations to approve board-proposed takeover defense measures, as well
as the recent instance where this was not the case,203 must be seen in
conjunction with certain Swiss shareholder voting mechanisms which
111 See Bckli, supra note 47, at 150.
200 Id. at 150, 152.
201 See Grfines Lichtfitr NestlP-Angebot an Rowntree, supra note 189 (prelimi-
nary opinion of U.K. Trade and Industry Minister Young finding that the differences
between takeover conditions in U.K. and Switzerland arise from greater willingness of
shareholders of Swiss corporations to adopt legally-permissible takeover defenses).
202 See, e.g., Sandoz-Vinkulierungsbestimmungen gutgeheissen, supra note 58 (ti-
tle registration limit of two percent approved by 95% of shares represented at share-
holders' meeting, despite publicized opposition of various shareholder groups); Opposi-
tion gegen die Vinkulierungsbestimmungen der Ciba-Geigy, supra note 51 (two
percent limit on registrable title shares approved with 73% approval of shares repre-
sented at shareholders' meeting, despite vocal opposition of various pension fund
representatives).
20 Cf, e.g., Hero/Jacobs: Nach dem "Takeover" das "Giveover", supra note
102, at 21, 22 (rapid drop in market prices for Hero AG bearer shares subsequent to
notice of proposed conversion of Hero AG bearer shares into title shares); with
Verteidigungswillige Hero-Aktionaire, supra note 133 (proposed Hero bearer share
conversion, coupled with issuance of non-voting PS, adopted with approval of 98% of
represented shares).
204 See, e.g., Grossaufmarsch von Hero-Aktioniren an der GV, supra note 132
(Hero bearer share conversion and stock split adopted with majority of widely-dis-
persed bearer shareholders, despite ownership of a near majority of such shares by
Saudi-Arabian finance group).
205 See Die "La Suisse" vollitihrt einen Rikzieher, supra note 96 (recommenda-
tions to deposit shareholders by various deposit banks to withhold vote or vote against
"La Suisse" board proposal for issuance of preferred-voting right shares to Swiss Bank
Corporation effectively giving board majority control played crucial role in board's sub-
sequent decision to withdraw proposal).
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strongly influence the probability that proposals issuing from Swiss
boards of directors will receive sufficient shareholder approval.
5.2. Physical Attendance Voting Requirement
According to unanimous legal authority and case law, the physical
presence at a shareholders' meeting of either a shareholder or a share-
holder representative is required under the Swiss Stock Corporation
Act for the exercise of voting rights pertaining to Swiss shares.20 6 The
purpose of the physical attendance requirement is to ensure that share-
holders benefit from an exchange of opinions and are given a chance to
participate in discussion prior to reaching a voting decision. 07
Relatively few shareholders of Swiss public corporations, however,
possess the necessary time and money to vote their shares in person at a
shareholders' meeting.208 Travel costs associated with personal attend-
ance may seem disproportionately high to many. shareholders, even
when merely intracantonal railway travel is necessitated.20 9 Further,
insofar as many Swiss public corporations provide little more than the
minimum ten days' notice of shareholders' meetings required under the
current Stock Corporation Act,210 the average shareholder may often
find it difficult to arrange personal and business affairs so as to permit
personal attendance.2 " Because of such considerations, Swiss stock cor-
308 See art. 689, T 1, 2 OR; Judgment of the First Civil Division of Dec. 17, 1941,
BGE 67 I 342, 347 (shareholders and their representatives may exercise voting rights
only at shareholders' meeting; even if unanimously approved, resolutions adopted in
writing without a meeting are invalid); see also F. W. BURGI, supra note 40, art. 689
OR, comment 6 at 350; A. ScHETT, supra note 104, at 20; FORSTMOSER & MEIER-
HAYOZ, supra note 31, § 19 at 149 n.10; H. P. WEBER-DORLER, GESELL-
SCHAFTERvERSAMMLUNG, URABSTIMMUNG UND DELEGIERTENVERSAMMLUNG ALS
BESCHLUSSFASSUNGSFORMEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTSRECHTS 108, 109
(1973).
207 Judgment of the First Civil Division of Dec. 17, 1941, supra note 206. But cf.
B. VISCHER, DAS AUTORISIERTE KAPITAL IM AMERIKANISCHEN UND SCHWEIZERIS-
CHEN AKTIENRECHT 243 n.120 (1977)(fresh examination of presence requirement nec-
essary; shareholders' meeting hardly ideal forum for exercise of shareholder participa-
tion rights).
208 See H. P. WEBER-DCRLER, supra note 206, at 54 (expenditures necessitated
by personal attendance requirement mean that only shareholders attend in person).
20 See, e.g., H. DUGGELIN, DIE SONDERPRfIFUNG ALS RECHTSBEHELF DES AK-
TIONXRS ZUR KONTROLLE DER VERWALTUNG EINER AG, Schweizerische Treuhands-
und Revisionskanmer, vol. 19, 8 (1977)(study comparing dividends paid by six major
Swiss public corporations in 1974 to actual 1974 railway prices for travel to annual
shareholders' meetings of respective corporations from six major cities in Switzerland);
see also supra note 47 and accompanying text (at least half of Swiss bearer sharehold-
ers are foreign investors).
210 Art. 700, 1 OR. See H. D0GGELIN, supra note 209, at 42-43 (notice as to
shareholders' meetings given by many Swiss public corporations only slightly prior to
ten days' minimum required notice period).
211 H. DOGGELIN, supra note 209, at 43; E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 51.
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poration law also permits a shareholder of a Swiss corporation to ap-
point a representative to represent and vote her shares at a sharehold-
ers' meeting. 12 As a rule, however, shareholders in a Swiss public
corporation lack effective means to contact fellow shareholders who
might be willing either to represent shares or to be represented at a
shareholders' meeting. Under the Stock Corporation Act, a shareholder
has no general right to demand from the corporation a list of title
shareholders.21 The identity of bearer shareholders is typically not
known by Swiss corporations and is instead known only by the Swiss
banks where bearer shares have been deposited, and such banks are
forbidden under banking secrecy provisions from revealing such
information. 1 4
5.3. Deposit Voting Rights and SBA Guidelines
In order to assist Swiss corporations in meeting certain inordi-
nately high quorum and approval requirements imposed under the cur-
rent Stock Corporation Act,215 Swiss banks with access to holders of
Swiss shares by virtue of deposit and administrative arrangements be-
gan in the years following World War I to collect general powers of
attorney to represent and vote deposited shares, offering such services
without cost to deposit customers. 16 The current average share capital
presence in shareholder meetings of Swiss corporations, between 50%
212 Art. 689, 2 OR. With respect to Swiss public corporations, practical consid-
erations of space also compel a right to representation. Cf Kritische Gedanken zur
Aktiondrsdenokratie, NZZ, Apr. 14, 1989, no. 6 at 37 (absent share representation,
100,000 shareholders would be present instead of the 3,000 to 4,000 shareholders actu-
ally attending).
13 See Judgment of the First Civil Division of June 23, 1964, supra note 41, at
174 (stock ledger is a purely private register, which is not unrestrictedly open for view-
ing by shareholders). See also F. BORGI, supra note 40, art. 698 OR, comment 28 at
306 (no shareholder right to view stock ledger without express permission of board of
directors); A. SCHETT, supra note 104, at 42 n.71 (same); U. BENZ, supra note 38, at
41 (shareholder right to view stock ledger only to clarify question of right to vote at
shareholders' meeting).
214 See Federal Act Concerning Banks and Savings Banks (Bundesgesetz iiber die
Banken und Sparkassen, vom 8. Nov. 1934 (SR 952.0)[BankG]), art. 47, I; Cf supra
note 50 and accompanying text. Similar obstacles lay in the path of ad-hoc shareholder
organizations seeking to obtain access to names and addresses of title and bearer share-
holders. See H. P. WEBER-DURLER, supra note 206, at 75 (advertising campaign by
ad-hoc shareholder group may awaken mistrust as to group's motives and incur costs
likely to be passed on to represented shareholders).
S15 M. ZWEIFEL, HOLDINGGESELLSCHAFT UND KONZERN 81 (1973). See, e.g.,
arts. 649, 655, 658 OR (necessary quorum of two-thirds issued share capital); arts.
636, 648 OR (necessary approval of two-thirds issued share capital).
211 H. P. WEBER-DORLER, supra note 206, at 67; E. TILLMANN, supra note 26,
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and 80%,2"" is largely attributable to the exercise of so-called "deposit
voting rights" by Swiss banks.2"8
As a rule, Swiss deposit banks agree to exercise deposit voting
rights pursuant to a revocable, general full power of attorney to re-
present the shareholder at each shareholder meeting.2"' The contents of
the full power of attorney are typically stipulated by each deposit bank
in accordance with uniform bank practices regarding the exercise of
deposit voting rights,220 codified in the form of guidelines for SBA
members.221 Where a deposit bank has received no special or general
voting instructions, either solicited or unsolicited, from a deposit cus-
tomer, the bank is required under the SBA Guidelines to vote the rep-
resented shares in favor of board proposals.222 A deposit bank must,
however, briefly inform deposit shareholders of the existence of any
"especially important" matter for discussion at a shareholders' meeting
and solicit special voting instructions relating thereto to the extent per-
mitted by time considerations.22 Deemed "especially important" under
the guidelines are, among other things, discussions as to alterations in
either the composition of issued share capital, the transferability of title
shares, or the representation of voting rights at a shareholders' meet-
ing.224 Special voting instructions must be similarly solicited under the
217 See H. DOGGELIN, supra note 209, at 11 (60% to 80%). Cf Temporair erhihte
Beteiligung des SBV an der Basler-Versicherungsgruppe, supra note 143 (64% share
capital presence at Baloise-Holding special shareholders' meeting); Verwaltungsrat-
streue "La Suisse"-Aktiondire, NZZ, May 28/29, 1988, No. 122 at 39 (78% share
capital presence at "La Suisse" annual shareholders' meeting); Sandoz-Vinkulierung-
sbestimmungen gutgeheissen, supra note 58 (71% share capital presence at Sandoz an-
nual shareholders' meeting).
218 H. DUGGELIN, supra note 206, at 11; H. P. SCHAAD, DAs DEPOTSTIM-
MREC1HT DER BANKEN NACH SCHWEIZERISCHEM UND DEUTSCHEM RECHT 137 (1972).
Cf. Kritische Gedanken zur "Aktiondrsdemokratie," supra note 212 (Swiss Bank Cor-
poration was the first Swiss stock corporation to publicize amount of shares voted at
shareholders' meeting by representatives; roughly 85% of total shares voted cast by
bank itself acting as representative of deposit shareholders).
219 See Botschaft, supra note 29, § 212.1, at 83. The Stock Corporation Act per-
mits but does not currently regulate the representation of and exercise of voting rights
by a Swiss deposit bank pursuant to a power of attorney or other authorization. See art.
689, 1 2 OR.
220 H. P. WEBER-DORLER, supra note 206, at 71-72.
221 Guidelines Concerning the Exercise of Deposit Voting Rights (Richtlinien
iiber die Austibung des Depotstimmrechts, SBA, Basel Sept. 1980 (rev. Nov.
1988)[hereinafter SBA Guidelines]). Such guidelines represent a private agreement ap-
plicable only to SBA members and are terminable at will. Botschaft, supra note 29, §
212.1, at 85.
222 SBA Guidelines, supra note 221, at I 5.
222 Id. at 2.
224 Id. Thus, most of the hostile takeover defenses typically proposed by Swiss
boards will trigger a duty to solicit special voting instructions under such provisions,
first included in the SBA Guidelines in November 1988. Prlzisierungen zum Depot-
stimmrecht, NZZ, Nov. 4, 1988, No. 258, at 33.
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SBA Guidelines in the event a deposit bank chooses to recommend to
its deposit shareholders either to vote in abstention or against board
proposals or to vote in favor of proposals by opposing shareholders. 2 5
The SBA Guidelines do not require a deposit bank either to notify
deposit shareholders of the existence of a public tender offer,226 or to
represent proposals by an opposing shareholder or shareholder group at
a shareholders' meeting.
2 7
For a variety of reasons, deposit voting rights are nearly always
exercised in favor of board proposals. 28 As an initial matter, share-
holders in Swiss stock corporations, particularly bearer shareholders,
are hampered in their ability to submit informed voting instructions
due to a lack of access to information regarding the corporation itself,
the shareholders' meeting and the specific proposals to be voted on.2 9
While current law requires, for example, that notice of a shareholders'
meeting be provided at least ten days in advance of the scheduled meet-
ing date,2 0 and although voting materials are as a rule provided by
Swiss public corporations to both deposit banks and title sharehold-
ers," 1 deposit banks are under no general duty, under either the Stock
Corporation Act or the SBA Guidelines, to forward received voting
materials to deposit shareholders, and the inclusion of such an under-
taking in a deposit contract is rare. 2  Thus, unless a shareholders'
meeting is to take place to vote on an "especially important" discussion
matter triggering a solicitation duty, bearer shareholders without daily
225 SBA Guidelines, supra note 221, at 3, 7.
228 Cf SCHMITTHOFF, GORE & HEINSIUS, UBERNAHMEANGEBOTE IM AK-
TIENREcHT, ARBErrEN zuR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 51 n.41 (1976)(under West Ger-
man uniform business practices code [AIlgemeine Geschaftsbedingungen], deposit banks
are required to notify deposit shareholders as to dissemination of public tender offer).
217 Botschaft, supra note 29, § 212.22, at 87. A bank is required to notify deposit
shareholders of an opposing shareholder proposal to an "especially important" matter
of discussion to the extent sufficient notice is provided to the bank. SBA Guidelines,
supra note 221, at 2.
22a M. STEHLI, supra note 110, at 69 n.19; J. P. BRUNNER, DIE PUBLIZITXT
DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN, INSBESONDERE DAS POSTULAT DER
BILANZKLARHEIT 81 (1976); E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 68.
229 The adequacy of available corporate information, on the other hand, for pro-
viding the basis of an informed voting decision is discussed generally infra notes 249-
272 and accompanying text.
220 See art. 700, 1 OR (corporation to provide notice of shareholders' meetings
as specified in its certificate of incorporation, but a minimum of ten days in advance of
meeting date; matters of discussion are to be made known at time of notice).
231 Due to control considerations, registered title shareholders typically receive
voting materials directly from the corporation prior to each shareholders' meeting, to-
gether with a form power of attorney to appoint a representative, even though the title
shares in question are deposited with a bank. E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 31, 151.
See Botschaft, supra note 29, § 212.1 at 84.
22 E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 11.
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access to the official bulletin of the Swiss Registry of Commerce or
other relevant Swiss financial publication23 3 will typically have no no-
tice that a shareholders' meeting is even scheduled.23' On the other
hand is the case where there is an "especially important" matter for
discussion, such as certificate of incorporation amendments to adopt
post-issuance Vinkulierung, which gives rise to a special solicitation
duty. When such a situation occurs, and the issuer corporation provides
no more than the ten days minimum notice of a shareholders' meeting,
as required under current law,235 attempts by Swiss deposit banks to
solicit and timely receive special voting instructions from deposit share-
holders, especially from deposit shareholders residing outside Switzer-
land, will be rendered pointless from the outset.2"'
Similarly, while Swiss public corporations are required under cur-
rent law to make available for shareholder viewing certain minimum
annual corporate and financial information at least ten days prior to
each annual shareholders' meeting 37 and will, as a matter of common
practice, send such materials directly to title shareholders and deposit
banks, Swiss deposit banks are under no corresponding legal obligation
to forward this information to deposit shareholders." 8 Furthermore, in
many cases annual corporate and financial information will be mailed
out by Swiss public corporations so close to the date of the sharehold-
ers' meeting that deposit shareholders will often not have access to this
information to permit the submission of corresponding voting instruc-
tions in time for the meeting.
23 9
Absent the receipt of special voting instructions from deposit
shareholders, a Swiss deposit bank is theoretically allowed by SBA
Guidelines to recommend a vote in opposition to or abstaining from a
23 Under art. 700, 3 OR, notice of a shareholders' meeting is to be published by
a stock corporation in the Schweizerischen Handelsamtblatt if bearer shares have been
issued.
2." See, e.g., M. BRUNNER, supra note 98, at 95 (bearer shareholders dependent
on reading Handelsamblatt or other Swiss publication to discover when shareholders'
meeting is to take place).
215 See supra note 210.
236 See E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 132, 149. For this reason, the SBA
Guidelines allow a deposit bank to decide, as an initial matter, not to conduct a special
solicitation based on time factors. SBA Guidelines, supra note 214, at 1 2.
I" See art. 696 11 1-3 OR (profit/loss statement, balance sheet, accountants'
statement, annual business report, and specific proposals for application of annual cor-
porate profits must be made available at principal and branch offices at least ten days
prior to annual shareholders' meeting).
238 E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 11.
239 See, e.g., H. DDGGELIN, supra note 209, at 42, 43 (study of practice of 92
Swiss public corporations with respect to time differences between making available of
annual financial information and date of annual shareholders' meeting; 51 of 92 corpo-
rations provided information from 0-12 days before shareholders' meeting).
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board proposal. For a number of reasons, however, such recommenda-
tions are rarely issued, especially with regard to board proposals for the
adoption of hostile takeover protections.' 40 Swiss banks are so-called
"universal banks," performing substantial credit-lending, guarantee, in-
vestment and other services for Swiss public corporations.24 These
other services could be adversely affected, even sacrificed, to competitors,
in the event a deposit bank were to make a recommendation to vote
against or abstain from the board proposals of client corporations.242
More specifically, a change in control could sever business ties between
a deposit bank and a corporation cultivated through means of interlock-
ing directorates, giving deposit banks a strong incentive to ensure that
adequate takeover defense protections are installed.24
5.4. Voting Mechanisms Under Proposed Stock Corporation Act
The Swiss Stock Corporation Act revision proposals would alter
the most important feature of current Swiss voting mechanisms, namely
the deposit voting rights, by enacting certain basic features of the SBA
Guidelines. There is disagreement under the various revision proposals
over whether alterations should be made with respect to the current
scope and nature of the voting solicitation duty of deposit banks under
the SBA Guidelines.
The Swiss Federal Council, Senate and House of Representatives
are currently all in agreement that the solicitation duty under the SBA
guidelines should be expanded under enacted legislation to require the
making of a solicitation prior to each shareholders' meeting, regardless
of the importance of the proposals to be voted on. 4 Where special
240 J. P. BRUNNER, supra note 228, at 81; H. P. WEBER-DUERLER, supra note
206, at 72 n.137.
241 M. STEHLI, supra note 110, at 89; E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 68. See J.
P. BRUNNER, supra note 228, at 81 (inside many Swiss banks, credit-lending business
more significant than securities department).
242 See, e.g., H. P. WEBER-DUERLER, supra note 206, at 68; E. TILLMANN,
supra note 26, at 93. Cf Die "La Suisse" vollfiihrt einen Riickzieher, supra note 96
(recommendations by various deposit banks to vote against or abstain with respect to
board-proposed issuance of preferred voting shares placing majority control in hands of
Swiss Bank Corporation suspected to be result of injured feelings and/or desire of de-
posit banks not to see control in hands of rival bank).
24 See, e.g., M. UNGERER, FINANZPLATZ SCHWEIZ 153 (1979)(large Swiss cor-
poration without a deposit bank representative serving on its board of directors is a
rarity); E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 76 (1979 study by Swiss Cartel Commission;
154 deposit bank representatives on board of directors of 88 Swiss public corporations
surveyed); H. P. WEBER-DORLER, supra note 206, at 68.
244 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 689d, 1, at 231; StRE 1988, supra note 170,
art. 689d, 11; Der Nationalrat belasst gewichtige Differenzen beim Aktienrecht, NZZ,
Sept. 19, 990, no. 217 at 26 (reversal of prior position of House of Representatives
requiring deposit bank solicitations only with respect to certain "important" matters).
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voting instructions have not been timely received pursuant to a solicita-
tion and where no general voting instructions have been issued, how-
ever, the House of Representatives would require the deposit institution
to exercise deposit voting rights either in accordance with the interests
of the deposit customer or to abstain . 45 The Federal Council and the
Senate would require deposit voting rights to be exercised in favor of
board proposals.
246
Features of the current Stock Corporation Act revision proposals
affecting Swiss shareholder voting mechanisms that enjoy wide support
include lengthening from ten days to twenty days the minimum re-
quired periods both for giving notice of shareholders' meetings and for
making available required corporate and financial information. 4 Iron-
ically, the original impetus for deposit voting rights, the need to meet
approval requirements based on a quorum of total issued share capital
for the taking of certain corporate actions, would be eliminated under
the revision proposals and replaced by approval provisions based on a
quorum of represented shares.248
6. IMPACT OF INADEQUATE DISCLOSURE ON TAKEOVER CONTESTS
6.1. Corporate Financial Disclosure: Hidden Reserves
As a practical matter, the Swiss Stock Corporation Act currently
grants the board of directors of a Swiss corporation unlimited discretion
to undervalue corporate assets and overvalue corporate obligations. The
directors may do this by taking legally unnecessary depreciation, or by
setting aside equally unnecessary reserves, thereby creating so-called
"hidden reserves. '2 49 The term "hidden reserves" is accurate only inso-
245 NaRE 1985, supra note 161, art. 689d, 2.
246 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 689d, II at 231. The House of Representatives
recently affirmed this position. Der Nationalrat belflsst gewichtige Differenzen beim
Aktienrecht, id. StRE 1988, supra note 160, art. 689d, 2. Under the Senate propos-
als, a deposit institution would arguably not be required to solicit special voting in-
structions where such instructions could not be received in time, as under the current
SBA Guidelines. Cf Botschaft, id. (if the depositor fails to issue timely instruc-
tions)("Erteilt der Hinterleger nicht rechtzeitige Weisungen") with StRE 1988, id. (if
instructions are not capable of being timely received)("[S]ind Weisungen . . . nicht
rechtzeitig erhaltlich")[emphasis added].
247 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 696, 1, art. 700, 1, at 232, 236; NaRE 1985,
supra note 161, at art. 696 1, art. 700, 1; StRE 1988, supra note 170, art. 696, 1,
art. 700, 1. Cf E. TILLMANN, supra note 26, at 149, 150 (lengthening to 20 days
insufficient; legislative reformers obviously did not consider interests of many, if not
most, bearer shareholders, i.e., those resident outside Switzerland).
24 Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 704, 1, at 236-7; NaRE 1985, supra note 161,
art. 704, 1; StRE 1988, supra note 170, art. 704, 1.
249 Art. 663, 2 OR (board discretion to create hidden reserves so long as deemed
desirable to assure continued prosperity of corporation or issuance of regular dividends
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far as, under current law, the creation or liquidation of reserves need
not be made known to corporate shareholders.250 On the other hand,
such "reserves" bear no relation to possible future corporate liabilities
or required expenditures and thus constitute in reality an application of
annual corporate profits, profits which would otherwise be available for
the possible distribution to shareholders in the form of dividends.5 1
Authorities agree that the average level of hidden reserves existing
in the balance sheets of Swiss public corporations is high,2 52 and that
cash flow figures for Swiss public corporations, therefore, normally
provide a misleading indication of actual return-on-investment
yields.25 The failure of these corporations to issue dividends that corre-
spond to actual earned profits,254 together with the average investor's
ignorance of the actual amount of hidden reserves, has resulted in an
often massive undervaluation of Swiss shares. This undervaluation has
occurred with respect to internal "substance value ' 255 as well as in
comparison to shares of foreign corporations for which hidden reserves
play only a limited or non-existent role.256
According to the traditional "market for corporate control" take-
in future); Judgment of the First Civil Division of January 24, 1928, 54 BGE 11 19,
29 (hidden reserves acceptable as long as purpose not arbitrary and not absolutely un-
justified by reasonable economic consideration).
250 Judgment of the First Civil Division of May 4, 1983, 109 BGE II 47, 51.
251 See W. KUPPER, supra note 127, at 26. But cf. art. 697 OR ("vested right" of
shareholders to determine application of annual corporate profits).
252 See, e.g., Arnold, supra note 32, at 41 (extraordinary loss of over one billion
Sfr. suffered by Credit Suisse in 1977 fully absorbed by liquidation of hidden reserves).
25I Schweizer Aktionar: Freiwild im Bilanz-Dschungel, SHZ, Nov. 19, 1987, No.
47, at 17 (hidden reserves built, e.g., by Swiss banks through reductions in interest
gains, by Swiss industrial corporation through booking of non-existent personal ex-
penditures, by insurance companies through failure to indicate gains on sales of securi-
ties). Cf Alusuisse als Informations-Winkelried, Tages-Anzeiger, Mar. 11, 1989, No.
60, at 33 (Alusuisse first large Swiss corporation to publish consolidated profit figures
without hidden reserves).
2" See, e.g., M. STEHLI, supra note 110, at 45 n.57 (average of 75% of total
earned profits retained as reserves and not issued as dividends to shareholders of Swiss
corporations, in comparison to 40% retained by U.S. corporations); Der Ausland-
sinarkt. Zilrich: Von den Launen der Weltbirsen abhangig, FAZ, Feb. 28, 1990, no.
50 at 25 (average dividend profit on Swiss shares (2.17%) is below world-wide average
dividend profit). Cf Elegant entledigt sich Jacobs seiner 400-Millionen-"Bfirde",
supra note 9 (mere 8% of 1988 Sfr. 458 million extraordinary gain on sale to be issued
to shareholders).
"' See, e.g., Offengelegte Achillesferse der Schweizer Unternehmen, NZZ, May
25, 1988, No. 119, at 35 (comparing 1988 Bank Vontobel study (Swiss shares listed on
Zurich stock exchange traded at prices average 30% below substance value, taking hid-
den reserves into account) with a similar study of Morgan Stanley Capital Interna-
tional (failing to consider hidden reserves, listed Swiss shares traded at prices average of
20% or more above substance value)).
256 Id. (listed shares of corporations of other major industrialized countries traded
on relevant stock exchanges at prices average of 20% to 90% above substance value).
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over theory, an investor will be inspired to acquire a target corpora-
tion's shares based on a belief that its shares are undervalued and that
greater efficiencies or innovations could be achieved and better corpo-
rate decisions could be reached if the corporation were under the inves-
tor's control.25 Under legal systems permitting both hidden reserves
and their "hidden liquidation," however, stock market prices will bear
little relation to the correctness or incorrectness of management deci-
sions, and the selection of a target corporation will occur based on the
accidental ability of an investor to glimpse the true extent of hidden
reserves harbored by that corporation.2"'
The existence of hidden reserves in Switzerland under current law
tends to affect hostile takeover activity in two diametrically opposed
ways. First, artificially low market prices for shares of Swiss public
corporations suspected of having substantial hidden reserves, together
with the even lower market prices for the restricted title shares of such
corporations, represent a powerful incentive for the launching of hostile
takeover attempts." 9 Despite the invisibility of hidden reservies to the
average shareholder, Swiss financial experts and sophisticated investors
are nevertheless occasionally able to trace the accrual of significant
reserves by a particular corporation.26 ° In the case of a takeover at-
tempt through secondary market purchases of shares of a Swiss corpo-
ration with substantial hidden reserves, a "raider" stands to realize an
inordinately large gain on the sale of his cheaply acquired sharehold-
ings. The sale may be to a white squire purchaser, at prices close to the
actual substance value of the shares,"' or it may be on the secondary
257 See, e.g., Immenga, supra note 1, at 90; Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L.
REv. 819, 933-44 (1981), reprinted in R. Gilson, The Law and Finance of Corporate
Acquisitions 371, 375-77 (1986); R. Gilson, id. at 377. Cf. Eine SEC-Studie zum
Thema Firmenilbernahmen, NZZ, Dec. 29, 1988, No. 304 at 27 (conclusion by nu-
merous economic studies that market prices of acquired U.S. corporations rise an aver-
age of 30% subsequent to being acquired); James, An Analysis of the Effect of State
Acquisition Laws on Managerial Efficiency: The Case of the Bank Holding Company
Acquisition, 25 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1984), cited in R. Gilson, id. at 385-86 (corollary
hypothesis that deterrent effect of active market for corporate control limits manage-
ment inefficiency).
258 Thus, shortly before market purchases of 35% of the issued title shares of
Sulzer AG by a unknown investor syndicate, a Bank Vontobel study pointed to such
shares as the absolute cheapest Swiss shares from the view of substance value. Aktion-
ire: Vom Wohltater zum Vampir, SHZ, Oct. 15, 1987, No. 42 at 1.
211 See Aktienrechtsreform: Raider, Super-oder Bad man?, supra note 89
(large cache of hidden reserves represents invitation for raiders).
260 See, e.g., Saurer profitiert vom Sulzer-Handel, NZZ, Apr. 6, 1989, no. 79 at
33 (noting that less than half of 31 million Sfr. gain on sale of securities in transaction
of Saurer Holding actually booked in corporation's balance sheet, thus indicating exis-
tence of sizeable hidden reserves).
261 See, e.g., Gewerbebank Baden in ruhigerem Fahrwasser, supra note 132
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market following the rise in market prices which have characterized
recent takeover attempts against Swiss corporations."'2 Similarly, in the
case of a tender offer for shares of a Swiss corporation with substantial
hidden reserves, a hostile bidder may offer two or three times the stock
market price of the shares, and nonetheless be assured of having made
a profitable acquisition in the event of a successful tender offer.2"'
On the other hand, insofar as current Swiss law does not require a
corporation's board of directors to notify shareholders of the liquidation
of hidden reserves, significant hidden reserves serve as a form of insur-
ance against financial losses that could result from managerial incom-
petence.26' The hidden liquidation of undisclosed reserves allows a
board of directors to issue the same size dividends from year to year.26"
Consequently, shareholders cast votes based on imperfect information
and this further prevents timely shareholder recognition of the desira-
bility of a change in control.2"6
The current Stock Corporation Act revision proposals would con-
tinue to allow the unrestricted creation of hidden reserves, but would
require limited disclosure of the liquidation of such reserves. Under the
proposals of both the Swiss Senate and the House of Representatives,
the aggregate amount of hidden reserves liquidated each year would be
required to be disclosed in notes to financial statements to the extent
these amounts exceeded the aggregate amount of newly-created
reserves. Provided that the financial results obtained through such liq-
uidation would thereby be presented in a considerably more favorable
light. 67
(profit of 25-30 million Sfr. resulting from sale by investor of Gewerbebank sharehold-
ings to white squire BB); Der 125-Mio. Deal, SHZ, Jan. 29, 1989, no. 5 at 3 (10
million Sfr. profit resulting from sale by Jacobs Suchard of Hero shareholdings to
Hero management group three weeks after shares acquired).
262 See, e.g., Gerfichte und Fakten zur Publicitas, NZZ, Sept. 8, 1988, No. 209
at 37 (stock market prices for Publicitas share sharply influenced by unceasing rumors
as to takeover attempts against corporation, despite fact that more than 60% of Public-
itas shares effectively inalienable).
281 B6ckli, supra note 47, at 152. Cf. supra note 149.
28 See FORsTmOSER & MEIER-HAYOZ, supra note 31, § 30, at 212 n.13 (hidden
reserves above all represent means to "hush up" business set-backs or erroneous
mangerial decisions).
268 Cf Arnold, supra note 32, at 41 (despite extraordinary loss of over one billion
Sfr. suffered by Credit Suisse during 1977, net profit disclosed for such year in finan-
cial statements slightly higher than that for following year, during which no unusual
corporate losses were suffered).
2, See, e.g., Lilcken im Alusuisse Kontroll-Netz. Aktionar, erwache!, SHZ, Mar.
27, 1986, No. 13, at 3 (Alusuisse corporate restructuring measures in response to
"overnight" appearance of 700 million Sfr. loss in financial statements arguably not
necessary had top management been replaced earlier).
267 StRE 1985, supra note 170, art. 663b, line 8; Differenzbereinigung beim Ak-
tienrecht, supra note 179 (newly-adopted resolution of House of Representatives to
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By creating a limited duty on the part of a Swiss board of directors
to indicate to shareholders the existence of losses requiring the liquida-
tion of unusually large amounts of hidden reserves, the Stock Corpora-
tion Act revision proposals would, in certain egregious cases, enable
both shareholders and would-be acquirors to perceive more clearly in-
stances of management inefficiency or incompetency. Since shares of
most Swiss corporations would continue to be undervalued due to the
existence of hidden reserves, rather than of indicated losses, a would-be
acquiror or investor would be likely to use information about a corpo-
ration's losses as a basis for rejecting that corporation as a possible in-
vestment target. Because financial disclosures indicating substantial liq-
uidations of hidden reserves, however, would only be required to be
made with respect to extremely severe corporte setbacks which would
be likely to draw publicity in any event, it is questionable whether hte
revision proposals will help to alert potential investors and shareholders
in Swiss stock corporations to the need to oust or revitalize incompetent
or inadequate management other than in situations where substantial
damage has already occurred.
6.2. Corporate Management Disclosures
The Swiss Stock Corporation Act requires each corporation to
make available to its shareholders an annual report disclosing and ex-
plaining annual financial results and presenting the activities of the
corporation during the past year.268 No specific disclosures are required
in the annual report under either the current Stock Corporation Act or
its proposed revisions. Matters reflecting on the integrity of current or
proposed members of the board of directors (e.g., board compensa-
tion, 69 security ownership of board members and/or corporate transac-
tions or business relationships affecting material interests of board
members) need not be disclosed.2"" Similarly, this information need not
follow approach of Senate regarding hidden reserves).
268 Art. 696, T 1, art. 724 OR. Cf Botschaft, supra note 29, art. 663c, 1, at 223;
NaRE 1985, supra note 161, art. 663c, % 1; StRE 1988, supra note 170, art. 663c, 1
(annual report, including business report, to present business developments and finan-
cial condition of corporation).
269 The current Stock Corporation Act does not even require that aggregate per-
sonnel expenditures be disclosed separately in relevant financial reports. Cf Botschaft,
supra note 29, art. 663, 3, at 222; NaRE 1985, supra note 161, art. 663, % 3; StRE
1988, supra note 170, art. 663, 3 (under proposed revisions disclosure of aggregate
personnel expenditures would be required as separate line item).
270 Cf., e.g., SEC Regulation S-K, 17 CFR §§ 229.401-404 (1989)(applicable to
annual reports, proxy statements, and offering circulars required to be sent to share-
holders of U.S. public corporations)(with respect to officers and current and proposed
directors, requiring disclosures as to identity and business experience, involvement in
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be disclosed in connection with making available board proposals to
nominate new directors.
Because most annual business reports of Swiss public corporations
do not provide a dependable basis for making a voting decision, corpo-
rate shareholders will either permit voting rights to remain unexercised
or allow them to be exercised by Swiss deposit banks acting single-
mindedly in favor of board proposals. 71 The lack of required corporate
disclosure about transactions or circumstances reflecting adversely on
the integrity, and indirectly on the competency, of current board mem-
bers, however, may prevent shareholders from being alerted to the pos-
sible need for a change in control before irreversible damage has set
in. 272
6.3. Threshold Share Acquisitions, Tender Offer Disclosures and
the Swiss Take-Over Code
The conduct of hostile takeover contests for Swiss public corpora-
tions is currently not explicitly dealt with under either the Stock Cor-
poration Act or the proposed revisions to the Act. Given the present
ability of a Swiss board of directors to effectively thwart hostile tender
offers through the refusal of title share registration, concerns over the
absence of regulations aimed at protecting shareholders during the
course of the tender offer, e.g., by requiring the equal treatment of tar-
get shareholders, seem somewhat misplaced. 78 The absence of certain
tender offer disclosure requirements on the part of the prospective bid-
ders, on the other hand, has in the past raised several real concerns
regarding the adequacy of shareholder protections in the context of a
tender offer, independent of the ultimate success or failure of the tender
offer itself.
First, the absence of regulations requiring that investors publicly
report share acquisitions of Swiss corporations in excess of a certain
certain legal proceedings, aggregate and certain individual executive compensation, se-
curity ownership, and certain business relationships and transactions with
management).
271 A. SCHETT, supra note 104, at 14.
27 See, e.g., Alusuisse-GV Wallenskins Lager, SHZ, Apr. 30, 1987, No. 18 at 22
("strictly confidential" pension retirement contracts totalling 15.7 million Sfr. for bene-
fit of three top directors of Alusuisse, signed on behalf of corporation by same three
directors, disclosed to public as result of employee indiscretion; losses of 724 million Sfr.
suffered by Alusuisse in 1986, requiring massive corporate restructuring measures.)
173 But cf, Ueber "unseriose" Uebernahmeofferten besorgt, NZZ, Sept. 7, 1988,
no. 208 at 35 (press communique of Association of Swiss Exchanges expressing concern
that tender offers for mere 51% of shares, such as those for shares of Rinsoz &
Ormond, "La Suisse" and Pubicitas,, place undue pressure on target shareholders to
tender shares into offer).
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threshold has permitted investors to accumulate large blocks of substan-
tially undervalued shares of Swiss public corporations over the market
without paying selling shareholders an attendant "market premium."
In other words, investors have been able to take advantage of the ab-
sence of market information concerning the intended control takeover
attempt which would have otherwise made the purchased shares more
expensive. Following the sale of the cheaply-acquired share block to a
third party deemed acceptable by the target corporation, investors have
often been able to realize substantial sale premiums"" at the expense of
the remaining shareholders, who are excluded from participation in
such profits and are normally helpless to prevent or control the target
corporation's granting of rich pecuniary benefits to the third party
purchasers.27
Second, in the past the absence of required tender offer disclosure
relating to the identity of the bidder and the bidder's sources of financ-
ing enabled various unidentified investors to manipulate stock market
prices for a particular corporation's shares through the circulation of
unfounded takeover rumors and the dissemination of anonymous tender
offers for the corporation's shares.
2 7
1
In order to "regulate public offers for interests in a public com-
pany in such a way that shareholders and officials of that company can
take [sic] their decisions on the basis of clear information,127 7 the Asso-
ciation of Swiss Exchanges presented, effective September 1, 1989, the
Swiss Take-Over Code. The Code is a private self-regulatory agree-
ment among the seven Swiss stock exchanges and the stock exchange
members.27  The Code defines certain permissible and impermissible
practices in connection with public tender offers, and is enforced by the
Commission for Regulation of the Association of Swiss Exchanges
("Regulatory Commission"). The Commission decides whether a par-
ticular offer is in compliance with the. Code and is authorized to take
certain steps to ensure fulfillment of the Code through, among other
274 Cf., e.g., supra note 262.
275 See, e.g., "La-Suisse" Aktionare locken wider den Stachel, NZZ, May 24,
1988, no. 118 at 9 (bank recipient of "La Suisse" shares in private placement for
purposes of securing control assured under terms of standstill agreement of stock mar-
ket gain on eventual sale of securities of at least 5.2 million Sfr., together with right to
manage 120 million Sfr. investment portfolio for minimum of five years). But cf. supra
note 242.
27I Cf, e.g., supra note 262.
217 Swiss Take-Over Code, Association of Swiss Exchanges, 1. September 198o9
[hereinafter "Take-Over Code"], § 1.
28 Schieflstiger Uebernahmekodex, NZZ, Aug. 12-13, 1989, no. 185 at 31. The
Take-Over Code applies to all public tender offers for Swiss shares handled on a Swiss
securities exchange and options or futures for such shares. Take-Over Code, § 2.
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things, recommending to stock exchange member banks that they refuse
to participate in the offer, if non-conforming.7 The refusal of stock
exchange members to participate in a non-conforming offer means a
refusal to finance the offer, to place payment or to act as the bidder's
representative.2 " The Regulatory Commission is nonetheless granted
discretion under the Code to "allow dispensations from certain rules of
the Code" when justified with respect to a particular tender offer.2"'
The duties of a bidder under the Take-Over Code are extensive.
Among other things, the Code requires each bidder to publish certain
information concerning his identity, the identity of all beneficiary own-
ers forming part of a bidder group, all sources of financing and all
previous acquisitions of shares of the target corporation within the pre-
ceding year.282 A bidder for shares of a Swiss public corporation is also
required to treat all shareholders in a comparable situation equally and
to hold the tender offer open for acceptance for a maximum two-month
period.28 ' The Code requires each bidder to present to the target com-
pany's board of directors a report of an accounting firm certifying the
bidder's compliance with the Code's requirements.28' The offer condi-
tions may not be changed during the course of the offer, other than to
increase the consideration or to extend the offer within the two-month
period.28 5 If, after the offer is closed, the bidder has, together with his
earlier shareholdings, more than fifty percent of the target company's
issued shares, the bidder is then required to purchase all securities
presented for sale.28"
Most notably, however, the Code does not require would-be bid-
ders to publicly disclose, prior to the disemination of a public offer,
share acquisitions in excess of a certain stipulated threshold. Such a
provision was thought to be beyond the scope of a voluntary self-regu-
latory agreement, such as the Take-Over Code.28 ' Thus, in effect,
while the Code reduces the ability of anonymous "bidders" to manipu-
late a company's market share prices through the dissemination of a
279 Take-Over Code, § 9.
280 Id. at § 7.
281 Id. at § 8. It is to be hoped that the Commission exercise this discretion in a
purely non-partisan manner. See Scheflistiger Uebernahmekodex, suprd note 278.
28' Take-Over Code, §§ 4.1, 4.3, & 4.4.
283 Id. at §§ 3.1 & 3.3.
284 Id. at § 5.2.
285 Id. at § 3.5.
288 Id. at § 5.2. Cf supra note 273.
287 According to the Chairman of the Regulatory Commission at the time of the
Code's drafting, such a reporting duty would be more appropriately and effectively
introduced through a provision of law. Kodex fir das Raiderland Schweiz, Tages-
Anzeiger, June 7, 1989, no. 129 at 39.
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specious tender offer, the Code has no impact on the continued ability
of a would-be acquiror to quietly accumulate large amounts of a Swiss
corporation's shares, either on the market.. or through negotiated
purchases.28 9 Disclosure of share acquisitions is required under the
Take-Over Code only if the acquiror, at its option, issues a public
tender offer for shares of the target corporation.
Although the Take-Over Code sets forth numerous bidder obliga-
tions, it nonetheless expressly permits target company management "to
adopt whatever defensive steps they wish" which comply with the law,
including a refusal to register the bidder as title shareholder.2 90 The
only real target company obligation under the Code is the requirement
that the target company convene a shareholders' meeting as soon as
possible at the request of a bidder who has more than 10% of the com-
pany's share capital, taking into account the bidder's earlier sharehold-
ings and all shares tendered into the offer thus far.2"" It remains to be
seen whether target companies will comply with this Code obliga-
tion, 92 and - in the case of non-compliance - how the Regulatory
Commission could effectively enforce target company compliance.29
A number of tender offers for the shares of Swiss public corpora-
tions, both unfriendly and friendly in nature, have been launched since
September 1, 1989, the effective date of the Take-Over Code.291 4 None
of the hostile tender offers disseminated after the Code went into effect
288 See e.g., Tagesgespr~ich am Ring: Markt von der CS-Offerte Ueberrascht,
NZZ, Apr. 12, 1990, no. 85 at 17 (foreign ed.) (in connection with commencement of
"bear hug" exchange offer for shares of Bank Leu, Switzerland's fifth largest bank, CS
Holding's announcement that it had, over prior two years, accumulated near majority
of Bank Leu voting shares greeted with surprise by Swiss securities dealers and market
participants).
289 See e.g., Philip Morris Cos.' Offer for Suchard Upsets Big International In-
vestors, WSJ, July 16, 1990, col. 5 at 9 (Philip Morris Co. able to acquire 62% voting
control of Jacobs Suchard through negotiated purchase of controlling shareholder's
shares prior to launching successful tender offer for remaining shares; controlling
shareholder received 120% premium over share price in tender offer).
2"0 Take-Over Code, § 6.1.
291 Id. at § 6.1. Under current law, a right to call a shareholders' meeting (and
request a vote, for example, on the target company's refusal to register the bidder as
title shareholder) may be exercised only by shareholders currently holding 10% of the
corporation's equity capital, without regard to tendered shares.
292 See H. Peter, Les Offres Publique d'Achat en Suisse: Analyse et kolution, en
particulier depuis l'entr~e en viguer du noveau "Code Suisse des OPA", 90 Schwe-
izerische Zeitschrift fiir Wirtschaftsrecht [formerly SAG] 153, 165 (questioning if tar-
get companies will comply with this provision).
29 Arguably, the only effective enforcement tool of the Regulatory Commission is
its ability to recommend that Swiss stock exchange members not participate in a non-
complying offer, a sanction solely directed at bidders, not target companies.
2" See Peter, Les Offres Publique d'Achat en Suisse: Analyse et kolution, en
particular depuis l'entrke en viguer du noveau "Code Suisse des OPA", supra note
292, at 162-65.
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have, to date, been in compliance with the Code."9 5 In each case, the
Regulatory Commission issued a recommendation or took other action
which led or contributed to the failure of the unfriendly tender offer.298
In comparison to these hostile tender offers, all of the various tender
offers unoppposed by target company management and disseminated
after September 1, 1989 have been found to be in compliance with the
Code.197 Interestingly enough, each of these complying tender offers
was disseminated by a bidder already in possession of majority or de
facto voting control of the target company.298 Thus, the Code has yet to
be tested in the case of a true hostile tender offer made in compliance
with the Code, where the result of the tender offer is not already virtu-
ally assured because of the bidder's prior, undisclosed stock
accumulations.
7. CONCLUSION
On the one hand, protections against hostile takeovers provided
under current Swiss law have proven to be inadequate to ward off the
dangers normally associated with control takeover attempts, e.g., the
diversion of valuable corporate resources such as time and money to the
planning and execution of takeover defense measures" 9 and the subjec-
tion of issued shares to market turbulence and speculation.' °0 On the
other hand, hostile takeover protections have proven ultimately success-
ful in blocking changes in control. This has proven true even where the
attempted takeover would have been likely to increase both the effi-
ciency and the profits of the target corporation.301 In this sense, present
"" See id. at 163 (two of three hostile bids not in conformity with Code because
bidder insufficiently identified; other bid made without regard to Code provisions).
296 Id. (in two cases, Commission recommended to stock exchange members their
non-participation in offer).
217 Id. at 163-165.
29 Id.
299 See, e.g., VierJahre hartnackige Belagerung, Luzerner NN, Mar. 3, 1989, at
5 (takeover struggle for Usego-Trimerco-Holding entering fifth year; total amount
spent by Usego during takeover contest to date over one million Sfr.); Curti erwirbt
Usego-Namenaktien von Schweri, supra note 78 (during course of recently-concluded
Usego takeover contest, Usego virtually stripped of access to capital markets and sub-
stantially hindered in its ability to engage in transactions by virtue of takeover defense
measures it had enacted).
"I0 See, e.g., supra note 262; Warteck-Uebernahme-versuch wurde zu PR-Gag,
FuW, Sept. 24, 1988, No. 75, at 21 (tender offer for Brauerei Warteck shares dissemi-
nated on behalf of unknown bidder by trustee firm; manipulation by owner of trustee
firm suspected). However, the Take-Over Code may have diminished the ability of an
investor to manipulte stock prices through a specious tender offer.
01 See, e.g., Aktionarsschutz: Vom "Znorge" zum "Zvieri", supra note 25 (pro-
posed takeover concept of Hero by rival Jacobs Suchard promised higher profits for
both corporations).
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takeover defense measures available to Swiss public corporations are
simultaneously overly-broad and too narrow.
In approaching the problem of ill-tailored takeover defense mea-
sures, Swiss legislators have until now primarily sought to close defen-
sive gaps in current title share-related takeover protections. Examples
of such attempts are the proposed elimination of the current market in
dividend rights to unregistered title shares and the proposed creation of
an investor duty to apply to the issuing corporation for title share regis-
tration. It is unclear, however, whether the disappearance of the pre-
sent market in severed dividend rights to title shares contemplated
under the revision proposals is alone sufficient to significantly decrease
hostile takeover activity. Other proposed revisions to the Swiss Stock
Corporation Act also make it less likely that takeover activity will de-
cline. For example, the proposals would make it more difficult for a
target corporation either to effect a partial or complete conversion of
bearer shares into restricted title shares or to secure control through a
share issuance to a white squire purchaser with the exclusion of pre-
emptive shareholder rights.
At the same time, the Stock Corporation Act revision proposals
have failed to eliminate certain unique incentives for investors to launch
takeover attempts against Swiss corporations. For example, market
prices and investment/yield ratios for Swiss shares, especially Swiss ti-
tle shares, remain embarrassingly low due to the continued widespread
existence of substantial undisclosed reserves and restrictive Vinku-
lierung provisions. Legislators have sought to improve the currently de-
pressed market for title shares through proposals requiring transparent,
standardized rules regarding denials of title share registration requests.
Nevertheless, it is highly likely that the depressed market for title
shares in fact results more from the limitation of trade in such shares to
Swiss investors through Vinkulierung than from the absence of stan-
dardized Vinkulierung denial grounds and investor uncertainty about
registration eligibility."0 2 Further, proposed revisions to the Stock Cor-
poration Act which would require disclosure with respect to certain liq-
uidations of hidden reserves would not affect the continued undervalua-
tion of shares in Swiss stock corporations which are in healthy financial
condition but possess substantial amounts of hidden reserves. Finally,
neither the Take-Over Code nor currently proposed revisions to the
Stock Corporation Act would impose a duty on acquirors to disclose
"02 This conclusion is practically compelled by, among other things, the enormous
impact on the price of title shares of NestlE and other Swiss corporations in the wake of
announcements by these corporations of a decision to allow trade in their title shares to
be opened to foreign investors. See supra note 47.
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share acquisitions exceeding a certain threshold in the absence of a
public tender offer. Therefore, investors could continue their current
practice of quietly and inexpensively accumulating shares of a target
corporation, then forcing the target corporation's board into arranging a
share buy-out, and reaping enormous profits which are ultimately paid
for by the target corporation and its shareholders.
An alternative approach to solving the problem of hostile takeovers
in Switzerland, not currently taken by Swiss legislators, would be to
correct distortions in the decision-making process of shareholders and
would-be acquirors of Swiss corporations which arise under current
law. Correcting these distortions would increase the probability that
control takeover attempts would both occur and succeed only when
launched against corporations in need of the innovation and greater ef-
ficiency that a change in control would represent. Such an approach
would require basic changes in areas of the Stock Corporation Act tra-
ditionally unrelated to hostile takeover defense measures.
First, the current practice of basing investors target takeover deci-
sions on haphazardly acquired information about substantial hidden
reserves and/or on the substantial undervaluation of the title shares of
a potential target corporation could be eliminated through a combina-
tion of measures. Swiss public corporations could continue to be al-
lowed to take unlimited amounts of hidden reserves but would simulta-
neously be required, under provisions of law or stock exchange listing
regulations, °s to publish the actual cxumulative value of these reserves.
By making this information widely available, the market prices for the
corporation's shares would more accurately reflect their true value.30' A
more accurate market pricing of shares would also result if Swiss pub-
lic corporations were required to make financial disclosures available
on a semi-annual, rather than merely annual, basis. The timely public
disclosure of a corporation's hidden reserves would provide higher in-
vestment/yield ratios and market prices, arguably "the best protection
I" As pointed out in H.D. VONTOBEL, KRrrISCHE BETRACHTUNGEN ZUM
RECHT DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN EFFEKTENBOERSE 101 (1972), a sharpening of corpo-
rate disclosure duties by means of amendments to the currently toothless stock exchange
listing regulations would have the advantage of automatically encompassing only Swiss
public corporations and, further, could be achieved through a process significantly
faster and simpler than that required for revisions to the Stock Corporation Act.
304 This step could well be accompanied by the taking away from shareholders of
their vested right to determine dividend levels (Art. 646 para. III OR) since such a
shareholder right is currently thwarted by the lack of a shareholder right to access to
accurate corporate financial information and by a corresponding shareholder inability
to judge the appropriateness of board-proposed dividend levels. Cf. supra notes 249-51.
The Swiss House of Representatives recently rejected a member's motion to require
disclosure of hidden reserves. See Differenz bereinigung beim Aktiensrecht, supra note
179.
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against undesired takeovers in Switzerland."' 5 Moreover, Swiss public
corporations could be required to allow issued title shares to be ac-
quired by foreign investors at least up to a certain cumulative minimum
threshold.308 As suggested by the experience of Nestle, and certain
other Swiss corporations, opening the trade in title shares could sub-
stantially improve the current artificially depressed prices for title
shares. Finally, a duty to disclose acquisitions of shares exceeding a
certain threshold of a public corporation's total issued shares could be
imposed on investors. This would eliminate the prospect of quick profit
which currently lures speculative investors. It would ensure that only
investors seriously interested in acquiring control of a Swiss stock cor-
poration would launch takeover attempts, and it would enable selling
shareholders to receive an appropriate price for their shares.
Second, as a way to increase the probability that shareholder deci-
sions result in the approval of control takeover attempts against corpo-
rations actually in need of changes in control, certain revisions could be
made to the shareholder voting process. For example, the intent of the
Take-Over Code in requiring a bidder to disclose in a tender offer his
identity, his share acquisitions, and his sources of financing, could best
be realized by placing Swiss deposit banks under a companion duty to
forward tender offer materials received- from bidders to deposit share-
holders.3 07 If necessary, costs for such services could be imposed on is-
suing corporations or deposit customers. Deposit banks could be placed
under a similar duty with respect to the corporate and financial disclo-
sures of Swiss public corporations generally.308 On the other hand, to
allow deposit banks sufficient time to forward these materials to deposit
shareholders, especially to those shareholders residing outside Switzer-
land, Swiss public corporations could be required to mail required dis-
closure materials to deposit banks at least thirty days in advance of the
applicable deadline.309
Until fundamental changes affecting certain disclosure and other
305 Hartmann, supra note 12.
$06 Because of the provisions of Lex Friedrich, a 33% cumulative foreign invest-
ment threshold suggests itself as an appropriate maximum threshold.
307 Imposing such a duty on Swiss deposit banks is arguably fair in light of the
factual representation monopoly enjoyed by such banks. See H.P. WEBER-DUERLER,
supra note 206, at 73.
308 Such a duty would presuppose both the conversion into law of the current
uniform practice of Swiss public corporations of mailing required disclosure materials
to Swiss deposit banks as well as the existence of a deposit bank's duty to solicit voting
instructions prior to each shareholders' meeting.
309 An extension of the current ten-day minimum period, and the twenty-day min-
imum period under the revision proposals, to thirty days would be advisable to allow
for the timely receipt and digestion of disclosed corporate information by shareholders.
Cf supra note 247 and accompanying text.
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duties of Swiss public corporations, Swiss deposit banks and investors
have been made, hostile takeover protections in Switzerland will con-
tinue to prove inadequate. Swiss corporations and their shareholders
will not be protected from the evils of speculative bearer share
purchases, nor from attractive tender offers motivated by prospects of
subsequent corporate asset-stripping and profitable sales to white
squire purchasers. Conversely, under current Swiss legislative revision
proposals, traditional takeover defense measures will continue to insu-
late management of Swiss corporations from control takeover attempts,
whether or not the takeover attempts are desirable. These difficult is-
sues await resolution through the ultimate adoption of revisions to the
Stock Corporation Act by Swiss legislators, anticipated to occur in the
mid-1990's.
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